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"A Lawyer Class": Views On Marriage and "Sexual 
Orientation" in the Legal Profession 
William C. Duncan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his dissent in Romer v. Evans, 1 Justice Scalia argued that the legal 
profession has embraced a perspective regarding issues of homosexuality 
that is not necessarily shared by the general population. He wrote that the 
"lawyer class" sees opposition to homosexuality as discrimination to be 
rooted out. 2 He contrasts this with: "the more plebeian attitudes" mani-
fest by the U.S. Congress (and presumably, the people they represent) in 
not including "sexual orientation" in federal discrimination law.3 Justice 
Scalia's comment is intriguing, but is it correct? The purpose of this arti-
cle is to answer that question. To do so, it will examine attitudes towards 
changing the definition of marriage, which has traditionally been under-
stood as the union of a man and a woman, and other "gay rights" issues 
in the organized bar and the legal profession generally. Given the promi-
nent role of lawyers in U.S. society, the answer to this question is impor-
tant. It is particularly important in the context of the same-sex marriage 
debate because, to this point, the push for recognition of same-sex mar-
riage has been confined mainly to the courts.4 
* Copyright © 200 I by William C. Duncan, Assistant Director, Marriage Law Project, Co-
lumbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. J.D. 1998, J. Reuben Clark Law 
School, Brigham Young University. 
I. 517 U.S. 620 ( 1996) (invalidating Colorado ballot initiative that forbade government en-
tities from treating sexual orientation as a protected category in discrimination laws). 
2. !d. at 652-653 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, INC. § 6-4(b); EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REGULATIONS OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS§ 6.19, in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 
HANDBOOK ( 1995)). 
3. /d. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
4. See David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Reaffinning Marriage: A Presidential 
Priority,_ HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v. _(forthcoming 2000). 
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state's marriage law, which recognized only 
marriage between a man and a woman, discriminated on the basis of sex and ordered a trial to re-
quire the state to show it had a compelling reason for retaining its marriage law. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In 1996, the trial court held that the state had not met its burden of justifying 
the law, but put its decision on hold while the state appealed back to the Hawaii Supreme Court. 
Baehr v. Miike, No.CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL694235, at *I (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996). Meanwhile, 
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This article will focus on policy statements on same-sex "marriage," 
but more prevalently, attitudes regarding sexual orientation which may 
indicate an acceptance of the ethic Justice Scalia described-the idea that 
opposition to homosexual behavior is bigotry that should be legally pro-
scribed. Obviously, this viewpoint has implications for marriage because 
same-sex marriage proponents argue that not allowing same-sex couples 
to marry or enter into an equivalent legal status is just another species of 
sex or sexual orientation discrimination.5 
This article will argue that the proponents of "gay rights" seem to 
exercise a disproportionate influence in the legal profession. Indeed, 
Evan Wolfson, the director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund's Marriage Project, who served as counsel for the "openly gay" 
man trying to force admission into leadership in the Boy Scouts6 and as 
co-counsel for the plaintiffs in the Hawaii same-sex "marriage" litiga-
tion,7 was recently named by the National Law Journal as one of the na-
tion's most influentiallawyers.8 As if to underscore the idea that support 
the Legislature passed and the citizens approved a state constitutional amendment that protected the 
power of the legislature to reserve marriage to the union of a man and a woman by a margin of 69% 
to 31%. See Mike Yuen, Same-Sex Marriage Strongly Rejected, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Nov. 
4, 1998, at AI; State Constitution, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 5, 1998, at B3. Finally, in 1999 
the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed the original case in light of the passage of the amendment. 
Baehr v. Miike, CN. No. 91-1394-05 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). 
In 1998, a judge in Alaska held that the Alaska Constitution created a fundamental right to 
"choose a life partner." Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, 
at *I (Alaska Super. Ct. 1998). Responding to this, the Alaska Legislature approved a state constitu-
tional amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman which was ratified by a 68-
32 margin by the people on November 4, 1998. See Liz Ruskin, Limit on Marriage Passes in Land-
slide, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1998, at AI. 
On December 21, 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court decided that the Vermont Constitution's 
"Common Benefits Clause" required the State to offer all of the benefits of marriage to same-sex 
couples even though the actual status of marriage could still be reserved for opposite-sex couples. 
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Having its hand forced by the Court, the Vermont Leg-
islature approved a bill creating a new status of "civil unions" that allowed same-sex couples to have 
all of the benefits of marriage. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (2000). 
5. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Dis-
crimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Samuel A. Marcosson, Romer and The Limits of Le-
gitimacy: Stripping Opponents of Gay and Lesbian Rights of Their "First Line of Defense" in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Fight, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 217 ( 1998); Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Mar-
riage, 9 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215 (1995); Mark Strasser, Statutory Construc-
tion, Equal Protection, and the Amendment Process: On Romer, Hunter, and Efforts to Tame, Baehr, 
45 BUFF. L. REV. 739 (1997); Mark Strasser, Sexual Orientation and Spousal Status: The Unre-
solved Question, 3 NAT. J. CONST. L. 288 (1993); Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: 
On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279 (1997); Mark Strasser, 
Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 981 (1991). 
6. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
7. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44; Baehr v. Miike, No.CN 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *I. 
8. Press Release, Lambda Attorney Named One (if Country's Most Influential Lawyers (June 
12, 2000) <www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=644>. 
137] VIEWS ON MARRIAGE AND "SEXUAL ORIENTATION" 139 
for same-sex marriage is no liability in the legal profession, Wolfson's 
co-counsel in the Hawaii case was recently appointed to serve as a judge 
on Hawaii's Intermediate Court of Appeals.9 
II. THE NATIONAL BAR 
In June 1995, the American Bar Association's ("ABA") House of 
Delegates approved a resolution supporting "the enactment of legislation 
and the implementation of public policy providing that child custody and 
visitation shall not be denied or restricted on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion."10 During the consideration of this resolution, an amendment was 
put forward which would have provided that "sexual orientation" could 
not be the "sole" basis for the denial of custody or visitation, but this 
proposal failed. 11 On February 8, 1999, the ABA adopted a resolution 
stating: 
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association supports the enact-
ment of laws and implementation of public policy that provide that 
sexual orientation shall not be a bar to adoption when the adoption is 
determined to be in the best interest of the child. 12 
In 1995, the ABA Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section's 
Committee on the Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men began a joint project 
in cooperation with the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund on 
same-sex marriage. The project involved state volunteers providing re-
search information to Professor Barbara Cox of California Western 
School of Law on the issue. At the same meeting, the committee also an-
nounced that it planned to develop a resolution for the House of Dele-
gates in favor of second parent adoptions for same-sex couples, follow-
ing on its successful sponsorship of the resolution favoring custody and 
visitation awards to same-sex couples. 13 
In 1996, the ABA Press for the Section of Individual Rights and Re-
sponsibilities of the American Bar Association published in Human 
Rights an article called To Love, Honor, and Build a Life: A Case for 
9. See Ken Kobayashi, Civil Rights Lawyer Nominated to Court, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
July 28, 2000; Press Release, Counsel in Landmark Hawaii Marriage Case is Named Judge (Aug. 7, 
2001) <www.lambdalegal.org> ("Evan Wolfson, who was co-counsel with Foley on Baehr v. 
Anderson, said, 'The appointment of Dan Foley to serve as a judge proves that championing equality 
for all is not a barrier to further career opportunities."'). 
10. Lester H. Salter, ABA Leadership Structure Debated-Report on 1995 Annual Meeting 
and Actions of the ABA House of Delegates, 44 R.I. B. J. 31, Mar. 1996, at 37. 
II. 1d. 
12. Jeffrey G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Adoptive Parents: The Legal Battle, 26 HUM. RTs., 
Spring 1999, at 7. 
13. ABA, 1RR News Report-Winter 1996, Committee Activities (visited Jan. 31, 2001) 
<www.abanet.org/irr/activities.html>. 
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Same-Gender Marriage, by Jeffrey G. Gibson. 14 At the time, Gibson was 
chair of the Section's Committee on the Rights of Lesbians and Gay 
Men. Professor Barbara Cox also contributed to the article. In the article, 
Gibson argues that there is "no logical reason for the prohibition" of 
same-sex "marriage." He posits that marriage is changing and that homo-
sexuals are gaining greater acceptance as indicated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Romer v. Evans. 15 He characterizes domestic partner-
ship arrangements as "akin to a 'separate but equal' form of marriage for 
gay and lesbian citizens, which emphasizes the 'separate' and minimizes 
the 'equal."' He believes that because homosexuals pay taxes just like 
anyone else, they should be able to have the same state sponsored bene-
fits as married couples. Gibson also argues that if one state recognized 
same-sex "marriage," then all of the other states would have to recognize 
these marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. Gibson also makes some more general policy arguments for 
same-sex "marriage": that the state has an interest in protecting the 
"emotional and economic stability" of same-sex couples, and that the 
state should encourage commitment. He discounts moral and religious 
objections as based on "bigotry and prejudice" and argues that these 
aside, there can be no defense of a prohibition on same-sex "marriage." 
At the 1997 ABA Annual Meeting in San Francisco the following fo-
rums were included: 
• "Same Gender Couples: Do They Have Any Rights?" with 
speakers Barbara Cox, Jeffrey G. Gibson, and Robert G. 
Klein. 
• "Basic Fairness and Equal Opportunity for Everyone: Same-
Sex Marriage, Domestic Partnership Benefits, Job Discrimi-
nation Based on Sexual Orientation" with speakers Mayor 
Willie Brown, Representative John Conyers, William 
Eskridge, Kate Kendell, Mike Gabbard, Joseph Broadus, 
Robert Whalen, and Reverend Lou Sheldon. 
• "Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Legal Commu-
nity" with speakers Brian Chen, Amy Oppenheimer, and 
Michael Sears. 16 
In the summer of 1997, the ABA' s Family Law Section published a 
model brief for a "same-sex second-parent adoption" written by a San 
14. See Jeffrey G. Gibson, To Love, Honor, and Build a Life: A Case for Same Gender Mar-
riage, 23 HUM. Rrs. 3, Summer 1996 (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <www.abanet.org/irr/hr/ 
gender.html>. 
15. 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996). 
16. ABA Press Room, News Release-1997 American Bar Association Annual Meetinf{ San 
Francisco (July 1997) <www.abanet.org/medialjul97/73lann.html>. 
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Francisco attorney .17 The brief argues that same-sex second parent adop-
tions protect the child's right to associate with both parents on breakup or 
death and provides for a source of financial support if the couple's rela-
tionship ends. It also argues that favoring certain adoptive parents based 
on marital status is "irrational." 
Jeffrey Gibson was again published in Human Rights in Spring 1999. 
This time his article was on adoption by homosexuals. 18 The article noted 
that the ABA "has long been a leader in efforts to eradicate bigotry and 
prejudice against, among other groups, gay and lesbian Americans." 19 
Gibson noted that the ABA is on record supporting allowing adoption by 
homosexuals and expressed his hope that the ABA's position would in-
fluence states considering legislation that would limit adoption by homo-
sexuals.20 He then argued that the reality that children are being raised by 
homosexuals militated in favor of allowing them to adopt and cited so-
cial science studies that purport to show no harm to children raised by 
homosexual parents.21 He then reviewed relevant case law on child cus-
tody and adoption and argued that children's need for a permanent home 
also necessitated a policy of allowing these adoptions. 22 
The official gay and lesbian presence in the ABA is the National 
Lesbian and Gay Law Association ("NLGLA"), which describes itself to 
members as "your voice in the 392,000+ member American Bar Associa-
tion.'m NLGLA has been an affiliate of the ABA since 1992 and "exists 
to promote justice in and through the legal profession for the lesbian and 
gay community in all its diversity."24 The Association conducts confer-
ences (including an annual "Lavender Law Conference"),25 maintains an 
"urgent action" network, publishes the Tulane Journal of Law and Sexu-
ality, files amicus briefs, and publishes a directory of members.26 
17. Emily Doskow, Same-Sex Second-Parent Adoption Briej; PAM. ADvoc. (Summer 1997) 
<www.abanet.org/family/advocate/sum97brief.html>. 
18. Lesbian and Gay Adoptive Parents: The Legal Battle, 26 HUM. RTS., Spring 1999, at 7. 
19. /d. 
20. See id. at 7-8. 
21. See id. at 8. 
22. See id. at 9-11. 
23. NLGLA, Directory Available, I QUEERLAW DIG. 679 (June 12, 1999) <http:// 
abacus .oxy .edu/pub/queerlaw/digests/vO 1.n679>. 
24. NLGLA, Homepage (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <www.nlgla.org>. 
25. In fact, Attorney General Janet Reno gave the keynote speech at the 2000 Conference. 
Rhonda Smith, Reno Addresses Gay Law Association, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 3, 2000. She was intro-
duced by Deputy Attorney General Robert Raben who said: "This attorney general supports and 
fights hard for [the Employment Non-Discrimination Act]. This attorney general supports and fights 
hard for hate crimes legislation." /d. 
26. NLGLA, Directory Available, I QUEERLAW DIG. 679 {June 12, 1999) <http:// 
abacus.oxy.edu/pub/queerlaw/digests/v0l.n679>; NLGLA, Membership (visited Jan. 31, 2001) 
<www.nlgla.org/members/index.html>. 
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This year, the American Bar Association filed an amicus brief in fa-
vor of a homosexual man seeking to compel the Boy Scouts to allow him 
to be a Scout leader in a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 27 
III. STATE AND LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS 
The most obvious indication of support for same-sex "marriage" 
within state and local bar associations (including non-geographical asso-
ciations) is that the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund lists the 
Bar Association of the City of New York, the Bar Association of San 
Francisco, the Japanese-American Bar Association, and the National 
Lawyers Guild as signatories to its Marriage Resolution, which states: 
"Because Marriage is a basic human right and an individual personal 
choice, resolved the state should not interfere with same gender couples 
who choose to marry and share fully and equally in the rights, responsi-
bilities, and commitment of civil marriage."28 
In addition to this, there are a number of other indications of the pol-
icy of these state and local associations regarding "sexual orientation." 
For instance, nineteen states have some organized "gay and lesbian" le-
gal associations. 29 California has eight such associations, and New York 
has ten.30 In fact, twelve such groups filed an amicus brief in favor of the 
plaintiff in the Boy Scout case recently decided by the Supreme Court. 31 
A number of state bar associations have general policies of non-
discrimination based on "sexual orientation."32 The State Bar of Califor-
nia's House of Delegates endorsed same-sex "marriage" in 1989.33 Then, 
in 1997, they renewed this position.34 Also in 1997, the Bay Area Bar 
Association took the same position.35 When the Romer v. Evans36 case 
27. Brief of the American Bar Association Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). For a more general discussion of the activist nature of 
the ABA, see Matt Kaufman, Lowering the Bar, Focus ON THE FAM. CITIZEN, Aug. 2000, at 6. 
28. Marriage Resolution: Selected Signatories (Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.lambdalegal. 
org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record= 142>. 
29. North Carolina Gay and Lesbian Attorneys, Other States' Gay and Lesbian Legal Or-
ganizations (Feb. 6, 1999) <members.aol.cornl _ht_a!ncgalalglbusa.htm>. 
30. /d. 
31. Brief of the Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom (BALIF), et al. in Support of Re-
spondent, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640. 
32. Hawaii State Bar Association Mission Statement, HAW. B.J., Feb. 1995, at 40, 47; See 
also John L. Vratil, Kansas Bar Association Report Card, J. KAN. B. Ass'N, Jan. 1996, at 2; Judici-
ary's Challenge: Render Justice to All, MASS. L. WKLY., Feb. 8, 1993, at 32; Edmund M. Brady, Jr., 
It Was a Very Good Year, 77 MICH. B.J. 894 (1998). 
33. Gail Diane Cox, 'New Reality' Dawns for the California Bar, NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 2, 1989, 
at 3. 
34. California Bar Association Backs Same-Sex Marriage, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 17, 
1997. 
35. Susan E. Davis, The Bar by the Bay, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1997, at 40. 
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was pending before the Colorado Supreme Court, the Colorado Bar As-
sociation joined in an amicus brief supporting the invalidation of 
Amendment 2.37 It has been reported that three attorneys in California 
have filed suit challenging their compulsory membership in the Califor-
nia Bar Association based on the Association's use of their membership 
dues to lobby the State Legislll.ture on substantive issues.38 The Philadel-
phia Bar Association has adopted a resolution favoring "sexual orienta-
tion" discrimination provisions.39 In 1999, the Chicago Bar Association 
wrote a letter to members of the Illinois General Assembly endorsing 
legislation to add "sexual orientation" to the State Human Rights Act.40 
In 1999, the D.C. Bar's Board of Governors adopted the Final Report of 
its Task Force on Sexual Orientation which calls for legal employers in 
the District to provide domestic partner benefits to employees, prohibit 
derogatory comments based on "sexual orientation," engage in pro bono 
work for (and publicize their involvement in) "gay and lesbian" causes, 
and make "gay and lesbian law student organizations" aware of job 
0 41 
opemngs. 
There is various other, anecdotal evidence of the positions of state 
and local bar associations on these issues. California requires Continuing 
Legal Education credits related "to elimination of bias in the legal pro-
fession based on" a number of considerations including "sexual orienta-
tion."42 In June 1997, the Massachusetts Lawyer's Weekly featured a 
story on the development of the Massachusetts' Gay and Lesbian Law 
Association.43 In October 1999, the New Jersey Institute for Continuing 
Legal Education sponsored a program on "representing gay and lesbian 
clients."44 Mark Johnson, the president of the Oregon Bar Association is 
"openly gay."45 In June 1999, the Cook County, Illinois judges joined the 
36. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
37. Frances A. Koncilja, Colorado Bar Ass'n President's Message to Members, 24 COLO. 
LAW. 751 (1995). 
38. Jack Kilpatrick, Lawyers Have Good Case Against Bar, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 21, 2000, 
at A13. 
39. Karen M. Goulart, Legal Group Calls for Inclusion, PHILADELPHIA GAY NEWS, Oct. 30, 
1999, at A9. 
40. Letter from Terry Murphy, Executive Director, Chicago Bar Ass'n., I QUEERLAW DIG. 
664 (Mar. 22, 1999) <abacus.oxy.edu/pub/queerlaw/digests/vOJ.n664>. 
41. See John McCaslin, Courting Gays, WASH. TIMES, July 12, 1999, at A6. 
42. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, CAL. MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION § 2.0 
(2000). 
43. Joseph P. Bam, One Lawyer's Reflection on 'Pride', MASS. L. WKLY., June 2, 1997, at 
II. 
44. ICLE and YCD Cosponsor Program on Representing Gay and Lesbian Clients, N.J. 
LAW. WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Oct. II, 1999, at 9. 
45. Kateri Walsh Mayo, Mark Johnson: Not Your Typical State Bar President, OR. STATE B. 
BULL., Oct. 1998, at 9. 
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Lesbian and Gay Bar Association to watch Chicago's Gay and Lesbian 
Pride Parade.46 
IV. ATIORNEYS GENERAL 
A less obvious, but tremendously important, indication of the climate 
in the legal profession on the issue of same-sex "marriage" has been the 
response of state Attorneys General in cases where the issue has been 
addressed. 
An interesting example of this occurred during the Tanner v. Oregon 
Health Sciences University litigation.47 This peculiar aspect of the case 
emerged early in the litigation when the plaintiffs, three same-sex cou-
ples seeking to compel the university to extend the benefits of marriage 
to same-sex couples, relied on a letter from former Attorney General 
Dave Frohnmayer for their argument that sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is forbidden by the Oregon Constitution.48 As a professor at the Uni-
versity of Oregon, David Schuman, who was later the Deputy Attorney 
General at the time the Tanner decision was handed down by the court of 
appeals, correctly predicted that the State would appeal but (based on his 
previous experience at the Attorney General's office) said they would do 
so while "hold[ing] their noses."49 He did, however, criticize the circuit 
court's decision, but only for limiting domestic partners to same-sex 
couples.50 After the court's decision, an assistant attorney general in-
volved in the case said: "We're the first ones to say that our constitution 
46. Aaron Chambers. Judges Making Rounds Attend Gay Pride Parade, CHICAGO DAILY L. 
BULL., June 28, 1999, at 3. 
47. 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). For a discussion of this case and the role of the Attor-
ney General in it, see David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Marriage and Democracy in 
Oregon: The Meaning and Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, _ 
WILLAMETTE L. REV._ (forthcoming, 2000). 
48. Plaintiffs Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint (Sep. 3, 1992) at 
14, Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences Univ., 980 P.2d 186 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). Attorney General 
Frohnmayer had previously made a similar argument-that the Oregon Constitution forbade "sexual 
orientation" discrimination in a case decided in 1989. See Jodie Leith Chusid, Tanner v. Oregon 
Health Sciences University: Justifying the Mandate j{Jr Domestic Partner Benefits, 8 COLUM. J. 
GENDER&L. 261,291 n.161 (1999). 
49. Tom Bates, Gay-Pair Benefits Decision Leaves State in Dilemma, PORTLAND 
OREGONIAN, Aug. 21, 1996, at AI. At least one other commentator agreed about the State's motiva-
tion for an appeal, arguing that: "At the very least, the appeal is perfunctory, intended to force the 
Court of Appeals to set binding precedent." See Chusid, supra note 49,at 262. Ms. Chusid further 
noted: "This seems to be the likely reason for the challenge since the state of Oregon has generally 
taken a liberal approach toward sexual orientation issues in the past. For example, former Oregon 
Attorney General Ted Kulungowski filed an amicus brief on behalf of the state in support of the state 
in support of the plaintiff in Romer v. Evans, the Colorado anti-gay rights initiative challenge." See 
id. at 262 n.8. 
50. See Bates, supra note 50. 
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prohibits sexual orientation discrimination."51 In addition, David Schu-
man had argued for the constitutional analysis applied by the court in a 
law review article published in 1988.52 Given all of this, it's not surpris-
ing that the Attorney General did not appeal the court of appeal's holding 
that the Oregon Constitution required the benefits of marriage to be ex-
tended to same-sex couples. 
At the hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the proposed 
litigation to define marriage as the union of a man and a woman in 
Alaska, John Gaguine, the Assistant Attorney General handling the 
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics53 litigation for the Department of 
Law, was the first witness. 54 He came with no prepared statement, and no 
comments to make on the revised version of the resolution. The Chair-
man asked him, "In other words, is this something appropriate to place 
on the ballot, and is it something that the people of the state should vote 
on, and is it in conflict with any provisions of the constitution?" Gaguine 
was reticent: "I do not want to speak for the Administration on this. As I 
said, I'm just here litigating it." But then he added, in simple terms, what 
would be repeated and debated by many witnesses and citizens later that 
day and in the corning months: "This amendment, it seems to me, would 
moot the litigation, and I think that's the intent of it."55 Later, after the 
amendment had been ratified by popular vote and the Legislature sought 
to have Brause dismissed, the Attorney General offered only a surpris-
ingly brief statement asking for the case to be dismissed and opposing 
the Legislature's motion to intervene. 56 
In Hawaii, the performance of the Attorney General's office was less 
than vigorous in the trial before the circuit court to determine whether the 
State had a compelling interest in retaining its marriage Jaw. Professor 
Lynn D. Wardle notes: 
51. Ashbel S. Green, Court OKs Benefits for Same-Sex Partners. PORTLAND OREGONIAN, 
Dec.IO, 1998,atAI. 
52. David Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities": A State's Version of 
"Equal Protection," 13 VT. L. REV. 221, 244-245 (1988). After the decision, Schuman suggested 
that the reasoning of the court could allow a finding that "sexual orientation" status also could pro-
vide the basis for finding a true class. See Shawn M. Filippi & Edward J. Reeves, Equality or Fur-
ther Discrimination? Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination in Oregon Statutory Employment Law 
After Tanner v. OHSU, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 269, 284 n.79 (1999). 
53. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *I (holding that same-sex couple had a fun-
damental right to choose a life partner and that trial should be held to determine if state had a fun-
damental interest to justify current marriage law). 
54. Gaguine's testimony can be found in the Draji Verbatim Testimony on SJR 42 Before the 
Senate Judiciary Comm. on March 9, 1998, Tape 98-15, Side A at 4-6 (Alaska 1998). 
55. !d. at 5-6 (discussing question by Chairman Taylor and response by Asst. Attorney Gen-
eral Gaguine). 
56. Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Brause v. Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1998). 
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The Attorney General decided not to present any evidence or argu-
ments in defense of the marriage law that would offend members of the 
gay and lesbian community. Preparation of the defense of Hawaii's 
heterosexual marriage law was delayed repeatedly, and the attorney 
originally responsible for defending the marriage law drew heavy criti-
cism for his delayed preparations and lack of enthusiasm to defend the 
law? 
In fact, 
Motions for leave to intervene were filed by members of the Hawaii 
legislature as well as by representatives of [The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints], while other religious groups filed amicus briefs in 
the case. All of these opponents of same-sex marriage expressed dissat-
isfaction with the lackluster defense of the case. 58 
Eventually, in the appeal of the circuit court's decision, outside counsel 
(attorneys from the Washington, D.C. firm of Cooper and Carvin) were 
brought in to represent the State.59 
On the other hand, when the Hawaii case was pending on appeal 
from the circuit court, an amici brief supporting Hawaii's marriage law 
was filed by the Attorneys General of eleven States.60 Under pressure 
from the Governor of Utah, Utah's Attorney General belatedly sent a let-
ter to the Hawaii Supreme Court joining the Nebraska brief on May 12, 
1997.61 Then, in April 1998, many of these same Attorneys General and 
others filed an amici brief in the Vermont same-sex "marriage" case.62 
The brief was not joined by Dan Lungren, California's Attorney General 
(who was running for Governor), the Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, and 
Michigan Attorneys General; and Utah's Attorney General Jan Gra-
ham.63 The failure of Attorney General Graham sparked a firestorm of 
criticism in Utah, with the Governor, Speaker of the House, and Senate 
President publicly taking issue with her decision.64 After the people of 
57. Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat 
from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735,741 (1998). 
58. /d. at 741 n.26. 
60See Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief, Baehr v. Miike, No.CIV. 91-1394-05, 1998 WL 
694235, at *I (Haw. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1997). 
60. Brief of Amici Curiae States of Nebraska, Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina and South Dakota in Support of Defendant-
Appellant, Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394-05, 1998 WL694235 (Haw. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1997). 
61. See Lynn D. Wardle, Why Graham Should Have Filed a Brief in Vermont Case, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., May 9, 1998, at A IS. 
62. Brief of Amici Curiae States of Nebraska, Hawaii, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Illinois, 
Arizona, Mississippi, Alabama, Missouri, South Dakota and Virginia, Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 
864 (Vt. 1999). 
63. See Lynn D. Wardle, Utah Must Join Fight Against Same-Sex Vows, DESERET NEWS, 
May 14, 1998, at A20. 
64. Jerry Spangler, Legal Battle in East Sparks a War in Utah, DESERET NEWS, May 2, 1998, 
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Hawaii ratified an Amendment to their Constitution providing that the 
Legislature had power to define marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman, a number of State Attorneys General filed another amici brief 
with the Hawaii Supreme Court.65 This time California, Colorado, Idaho, 
and Utah were back. The last wrinkle in this matter occurred on February 
12, 1999, when the Attorney General of Nebraska filed notice with the 
court that California had withdrawn its support of the brief.66 This was 
occasioned by the election of a new California Attorney General, Bill 
Lockyer. 
Parenthetically, in the U.S. Supreme Court Boy Scout case a number 
of State Attorneys General filed an amici brief supporting the homosex-
ualleader.67 Significantly, the Attorneys General of Hawaii, Oregon, and 
Vermont joined this brief. 
V. JUDICIARY 
Within the Judiciary, there are two major developments that bear on 
the issue: (1) "openly gay" judges and (2) the inclusion of sexual orienta-
tion discrimination provisions in judicial ethics codes. 
A. Openly Gay Judges 
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit wrote an op-ed in the 
Washington Post on the subject of "openly gay" federal judges in 1993.68 
In this article, Judge Reinhardt advocated a debate on the issue in the 
ABA and among judges and academics. Judge Reinhardt also shared his 
opinion that "we must remove the barrier that has precluded fair and 
equal treatment for gays and lesbians in the area of government service 
that most directly affects citizens' fundamental rights .... I believe that 
homosexuals are as entitled as any other persons to serve as judges of the 
federal courts."69 Professor William B. Rubinstein also argued that in or-
der to effectuate real change that would be positive for "gay and lesbian" 
at AI. 
65. Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae States of Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah, Baehr v. Miike, No.CIV. 91-1394-
05, 1998 WL 694235, at *I (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1998). 
66. Notice of California's Withdrawal, Baehr v. Miike, No.CIV. 91-1394-05, 1998 WL 
694235 (Haw. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1998). 
67. Brief of the State of New York, et. al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. at 640 (the Attorneys General represented New York, California, 
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont and Washington); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae State of New Jersey, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. at 640. 
68. Stephen Reinhardt, The Court and the Closet, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1993, at C03. 
69. /d. 
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attorneys, more "openly gay" attorneys need to be appointed to the judi-
ciary.70 
Currently, there is only one "openly gay" member of the Federal Ju-
diciary, Judge Deborah Batts of the Southern District of New York.71 
The number of "openly gay" judges on the state level is less clear and 
evidence is, of necessity, mostly anecdotal. For instance, a North Caro-
lina Superior Court judge recently announced that he was homosexual, 
becoming the first elected Republican in the state ever to do so.72 Just 
last month, the Cook County, Illinois circuit court judges appointed the 
first lesbian judge in the state to an associate judge position.73 The article 
noting this development mentioned that there were already two homo-
sexual men serving as circuit court judges.74 In New York City, ten 
"openly gay" judges have been appointed to the bench in the last fifteen 
years.75 In June 2000, Denver's "first openly gay judge" was appointed 
to a county court position. In the article discussing her appointment, the 
judge claimed that there are "18 openly gay and lesbian judges in the 
country, and only five of them are women."76 
B. Codes of Judicial Conduct 
The Codes of Judicial Conduct of thirty-two states mention "sexual 
orientation" in some context.77 Canon 3 of Alaska's Code of Judicial 
Conduct follows the general pattern for the "sexual orientation" dis-
crimination provisions in the state codes. It states: "In the performance of 
judicial duties, a judge shall act without bias or prejudice and shall not 
manifest by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon ... sexual 
orientation .... "78 In Canon 4 relating to "extra-judicial activities" the 
commentary states: "Even outside the judicial role, a judge who ex-
presses bias or prejudice may cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capac-
70. William B. Rubinstein, Queer Studies II: Some R~flections on the Study of Sexual Orien-
tation Bias in the Legal Profession, 8 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 379,401 (1998). 
71. /d.at401. 
72. North Carolina Judge Declares Homosexuality, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. I 0, 1998, at 
A25. 
73. John Flynn Rooney, Court Selects First Openly Lesbian Judge, CHICAGO DAILY LAW. 
BULL., Oct. 18, 1999, at I. 
74. /d. 
75. Michael R. Sonberg, Guy Judges Declared No Longer a Rarity, N.Y. L.J., June II, 1999, 
at 2. 
76. George Lane, Denver's First Openly Guy Judge, DENVER POST, June 27, 2000, at B2. 
77. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
78. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 ( 1998). 
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ity to act impartially as a judge. Such expressions include jokes or other 
remarks demeaning individuals on the basis of their ... sexual orienta-
tion .... "79 Both of these provisions come from the ABA's model Code 
of Judicial Conduct. They are employed in the Codes of Arizona,8° Cali-
f . 8I Fl .d 82 H .. s1 K 84 N b k 85 N d 86 N h D om1a, on a, awau, · ansas, e ras a, · eva a, ort a-
kota,87 Rhode Island,88 and Tennessee.89 
The bias provision (see Canon 3 of Alaska's Code of Judicial Con-
duct in the preceding paragraph) of the model code is also used in Colo-
90 91 . 92 93 . 94 95 
rado, Delaware, Georg1a, Kentucky, Mame, Maryland, 
% . ~ ~ . ~ Massachusetts, Mmnesota, New Jersey, New Mextco, New 
York,Ioo Ohio,IOI Oklahoma,I 02 Texas,I 03 Utah, 104 Vermont, 105 West 
V. . . Io6 w· . Io7 d w . ws trgmta, tsconsm, an yommg. 
California's Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics states: "A judge 
shall not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious 
discrimination on the basis of ... sexual orientation .... "This provision 
79. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 ( 1998). 
80. ARIZONA Sur. CT. RULES Rule 81, Canons 3 & 4 ( 1993). 
81. CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canons 3 & 4 ( 1997). 
82. In rc Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1994). 
83. HAW All CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3 & 4 (1999). 
84. KANSAS Sur. CT. RULES, Rule 601A Canons 3 & 4 (1997). 
85. NEBRASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3 & 4 ( 1996). 
86. NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3 & 4 (2000). 
87. NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3 & 4 (1999). 
88. RHODE ISLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3 & 4 ( 1999). 
89. TENNESSEE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3 & 4 ( 1999). 
90. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1998). 
91. DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1993). 
92. GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1998). 
93. KENTUCKY Sur. CT. RULES Rule 4.300 (2000). 
94. MAINE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon } (2000). 
95. MARYLAND RULES OF CTS. JUDGES, & ATTORNEYS Rule 16-813 Canon 3 (1999). 
96. MASSACHUSETTS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 3:09 Canon 3 ( 1999). 
97. MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 ( 1996). 
98. NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2000). 
99. NEW MEXICO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 21-300 ( 1995). 
100. NEW YORK CT. RULES§ 100.3 (2000). 
I 0 I. OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 ( 1997). 
102. OKLAHOMA CODE OF JUDICIAL. CONDUCT Canon 3 (1998). 
I 03. TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 ( 1999). 
I 04. UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 ( 1994). 
105. VERMONT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1998). 
I 06. WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1993). 
107. WISCONSIN SUP. CT. RULES Rule 60.04 (1998). 
] 08. WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1991). 
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mont.11 1 
Hawaii's rules governing the conduct of the Judicial Selection 
Commission states: "No commissioner shall discriminate on the basis of 
nor manifest, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on ... sexual 
orientation .... " 112 
Idaho's bias provision states: "Judges shall not, by word or act, 
manifest any belief, attitude or position which has no substantial legiti-
mate purpose, other than to embarrass, harass or discriminate against an-
other person by reason of such person's ... sexual orientation .... " 113 
Minnesota law further requires that "the judge ... shall not discrimi-
nate on the basis of ... sexual preference,"114 and makes discrimination 
based on "sexual preference" by a judge a ground for discipline. 115 
New Jersey's bias provision states: "A judge should be impartial and 
should not discriminate because of ... sexual orientation .... " 116 
C. Effect of Judicial Codes 
There is very little direct information on the effect of these codes. 
Recently, controversies have played out in California and Illinois, and a 
few states have case law addressing the issue. In Kansas, a case involv-
ing the Westboro Baptist Church (with its notorious pastor, Fred Phelps) 
raised issues that, while not exactly on-point, do shed some light on the 
potential effect of these codes. In that case, a trial court judge issued a 
temporary restraining order against the Westboro Baptist Church which 
forbade them from picketing an Episcopal Church.1 17 In the course of the 
litigation, the Westboro Baptist Church challenged the impartiality of the 
judge, based on the fact that he had signed a petition about a year before 
the case was filed which stated: 
We, the undersigned, offer witness of our belief that all people have the 
right to live in dignity, in safety and in privacy, regardless of race, eth-
nicity, religious preference or sexual orientation. We embrace love 
rather than hate; safety rather than endangerment, respect rather than 
109. NEW YORK CT. RULES§ 100.2 (2000). 
110. OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT JR-1-101 (1999). 
Ill. VERMONT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2000). 
112. HAWAII JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM'N Rule 5 ( 1995). 
113. IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2000). 
114. MINNESOTA GEN. RULES OF PRACTICE Rule 2.02 (1997). 
115. MINNESOTA RULES OF BD. ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS Rule 4 (1996) 
116. NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2000). 
117. Saint David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 1996). 
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harassment. Our commitment to these beliefs compels us to create a 
. h h I 118 commumty t at promotes t ese va ues. 
The Baptist Church argued that the petition was clearly aimed at its ac-
tivities and thus showed that the judge was biased against it. The court 
accepted this argument and concluded that another judge should be as-
signed for further proceedings. 119 
More to the point is a Florida case, where a woman involved in a 
same-sex relationship was convicted of battery for attacking the seven-
teen-year-old daughter of her partner. 120 The defendant filed a motion to 
disqualify the judge alleging that comments by the judge indicated bias 
on the basis of the defendant's "sexual orientation." 121 The court reported 
the judge's comments as follows: 
At the conclusion of the testimony the judge observed, "I'll tell you, 
ma'am. This is a sick situation." And: "I've seen a lot of sick situations 
since I've been in this court. I've been in the profession for 27 years 
and this ranks at the top." The judge repeated the sentiment of this 
comment a third time. After announcing the sentence, the judge con-
cluded with the observation that "[i]f this is the family of 1997, heaven 
h l ,122 e pus. 
The defendant argued that her case was like many other cases of domes-
tic violence, so the judge's reaction that this was extraordinary must have 
been based on the fact that defendant was involved in a same-sex rela-
tionship. 123 The court held that the defendant's fear of bias by the judge 
was well-grounded and requested the judge to remove himself so another 
judge could be assigned. 124 
A more recent case in Nebraska involved a defendant who was con-
victed of sexually assaulting a child. 125 In that case, the defendant argued 
that the judge's reading of a Bible passage "which disparaged homo-
sexuality" during sentencing "manifested bias against [defendant] be-
cause of his sexual orientation."126 The defendant had met the victim, a 
thirteen-year-old boy, through the Internet and had been involved in a 
sexual relationship with him. Defendant was a volunteer for a Big 
Brother/Big Sister program, worked for the Latch Key Program of the 
118. See id. at 833. 
119. /d. at 834. 
120. Rucks v. State, 692 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
121. /d. at 976-977. 
122. See id. at 977. 
123. /d. 
124. See id. at 977-978. 
125. See State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999). 
126. /d. at 505. 
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YMCA, and taught seventh graders in a religious education program. He 
was found to have indicated signs of pedophilia in a psychiatric analysis 
after his arrest and had maintained contact with the victim after his ar-
rest.127 He was sentenced from 20 months to 5 years of imprisonment. 128 
During sentencing, the judge read Romans 1:20-27. 129 The defendant ar-
gued that he should have received probation as a first-time offender and 
because the relationship was consensua1. 130 The court analyzed the claim 
of bias on a "reasonable basis" standard. 131 The defendant argued that the 
mere reading of the scripture showed bias, but the State countered that 
the judge was just making an allowable personal observation. 132 The 
court held that because the biblical passage was about homosexuality and 
not child molestation, it should not have been considered in this case. 
The court also found it particularly troublesome that the judge had even 
used scripture given the need to keep church and state separate. 133 The 
court concluded that it is impermissible for a judge to rely on personal 
religious beliefs in making sentencing decisions and that a reasonable 
person could have concluded that the judge in this case was biased. 134 
Therefore, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for consid-
. b h . d 135 eratlon y anot er JU ge. · 
In California, the issue of "sexual orientation" bias was raised in the 
judiciary in regard to the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA"). In 1992, at a 
meeting of the California Judges Association, an amendment to the Code 
of Judicial Conduct was offered that would have forbidden membership 
in an organization that discriminated on the basis of "sexual orientation." 
The amendment was rejected and when presented the next year, rejected 
again. 136 It was eventually adopted. While this debate was going on, the 
Boy Scout rejection of homosexual members was challenged under Cali-
fornia's anti-discrimination law. 137 The president of the California 
Judge's Association expressed his opinion that if the Boy Scouts were 
found to be in violation of the law, it would be unethical for judges to be-
127. !d. 
128. !d. at 506. 
129. !d. 
130. !d. 
131. !d. at 508. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. at 508-509. 
134. See id. at 509. 
135. !d. 
136. Philip Hager, Public Figures' Private Lives, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1994, at 41; Alan Abra-
hamson, Judge's Boy Scout Duties Spur Ethics Debate, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1995, at I. 
137. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 
1998). 
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long to such an organization.138 Jon Davidson, then with the American 
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), expressed the opinion that membership 
in the BSA would be unethical regardless of how the court ruled. 139 The 
California Supreme Court issued its opinion of the Boy Scout case in 
March 1998. 140 In a footnote, the court noted that it had received a letter 
regarding the application of the Judicial Code to a judge's membership in 
the Boy Scouts. 141 The court rejected the arguments of potential bias, 
saymg: 
Preliminarily, we note that although neither of the parties has raised the 
point, the court has received a letter expressing concern that the court 
may have a potential conflict of interest or at least the appearance of 
such a conflict in this case and in Randall v. Orange County Council, as 
a result of the court's adoption of the Code of Judicial Ethics, effective 
January 15, 1996, which contains a provision barring a judge from 
holding membership in any organization that practices invidious dis-
crimination on the basis of "race, sex, religion, national origin, or sex-
ual orientation," and also contains an exception for membership in a 
"nonprofit youth organization." For several reasons, we believe it is 
clear that no conflict of interest or reasonable appearance of such a con-
flict exists. First, the issue to which Canon 2C is directed (whether a 
judge should be precluded as an ethical matter from participating in a 
given organization) is totally distinct from the issues presented in these 
cases (whether a specific statute [the Unruh Civil Rights Act] applies to 
the membership decisions of the Boy Scouts, and, if applicable, 
whether the Act constitutionally may be applied to prohibit the organi-
zation from excluding a would-be adult or youth member under par-
ticular circumstances). Second, even if the court's action in adopting 
the code were to have reflected a legal conclusion on an issue relevant 
to these proceedings, the adoption of the code still would not give rise 
to a conflict of interest that would affect the justices' participation in 
these cases. Courts routinely are called upon to apply, modify, or re-
consider prior legal determinations in subsequent litigation, and a 
judge's participation in a prior decision involving a related legal issue 
has not been viewed as creating a conflict of interest or providing a ba-
sis for recusal in the later proceeding. Accordingly, the court's adoption 
of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides no basis for questioning the 
propriety of the justices' participation in these cases. 142 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, a California state appeals court judge resigned his position as an 
138. See Hager, supra note 137, at 41. 
139. See id. 
140. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 218. 
141. Seeid.at227,n.10. 
142. /d. (citations omitted). 
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assistant scoutmaster. In an open letter to the Scouts, he charged that af-
filiation with the Scouts was "ethically questionable for judges every-
where."143 
A very recent case involved a judge, Susan McDunn in Cook 
County, Illinois, who was assigned to a case dealing with petitions for 
adoption by two same-sex couples.144 When Judge McDunn hesitated to 
allow the adoptions until after hearings were held in both cases, the par-
ties to the first case successfully moved to have the cases assigned to an-
other judge. 145 The parties in the second case also successfully had their 
case assigned to another judge when Judge McDunn added the Family 
Research Council ("FRC") as a party in the case, sua sponte. 146 In both 
cases, a new judge entered a final judgment of adoption, but Judge 
McDunn subsequently issued an order voiding the other judge's deci-
sions and again named the FRC as a "necessary party" and "secondary 
guardian."147 The other judge ordered the invalidation of these orders, 
and Judge McDunn ordered that this decision be voided. 148 The Illinois 
Appellate Court agreed to hear the case on an emergency basis and af-
firmed the second judge's rulings. 149 The court held that the addition of 
the FRC was illogical and without legal justification and that the dis-
qualification of Judge McDunn was justified by her "predetermined bias 
against lesbians."150 Judge McDunn was subsequently removed from 
courtroom duties. 151 Previously, she had been "abruptly transferred to 
Traffic Court" when she had hesitated to grant one of the adoption de-
crees.152 
Though not directly applicable, an interesting, analogous case in-
volving membership in an organization arose in Idaho in litigation in-
volving an effort by the Idaho and Arizona legislators to obtain a declara-
tory judgement that the Idaho Legislature had effectively rescinded its 
ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"). 153 The 
defendants in the case sought to have the judge disqualified because of 
143. See Carol Ness, Judge Quits As Scoutmaster Over Gay Policy, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 15, 
2000, at A4. 
144. See Adrienne Drell, Judge Rebuked on Adoptions Removed from Courtroom Duties, 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 4, 1999, at 14. 
145. See In the Matter ofC.M.A., Nos. 1-99-0769 & 1-99-0770, 1999 WL 507853, *1-*3 (Ill. 
App. Ct. July 19, 1999). 
146. See id. at *3-*4. 
147. !d. at *4. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. at *5. 
150. !d. at *5. 
151. See Adrienne Drell, supra note 145, at 14. 
152. !d. 
153. See Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979). 
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his position as a "Regional Representative" for The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints which had openly opposed the ERA and the 
extension of the deadline for ratification. 154 Judge Callister refused to 
disqualify himself, noting that his membership in a Church that had ex-
pressed a position on the underlying issues did not make him unable to 
issue an unbiased ruling on the legal issues involved. 155 Later the Na-
tional Organization of Women also sought to disqualify Judge Callister, 
but that motion was again denied. 156 
Recently, Jennifer Gerada Brown, a law professor, constructed a de-
tailed argument about the possible substantive effects of judicial codes 
including provisions regarding "sexual orientation" bias (the author re-
fers to the provision as Canon 3). 157 As the author concedes, her analysis 
would only apply to state court judges.158 Nevertheless, her reading, 
while novel, does give one pause regarding the possible effects of these 
code provisions. Thus, the argument will be summarized in some detail. 
Professor Brown's argument is that the "seemingly small procedural 
rule" of the anti-bias provision "could have huge substantive effects" on 
litigation regarding same-sex couples and homosexual persons. 159 She 
summarizes the effect in this way: "By lodging formal challenges to the 
judicial bias that feeds distorted fact finding and inaccurate application of 
law, gay and lesbian litigants can work within existing state law to en-
hance the protection they receive in state courts." 160 Specifically, "Canon 
3 can provide an imperfect substitute for heightened scrutiny of judicial 
action" or "replicate some of the results that heightened scrutiny would 
require." 161 Professor Brown notes that this reading of the bias provisions 
could have an especially significant effect on family law cases. 162 Spe-
cifically, Professor Brown's reading of the provisions could change 
judges' readings of "ambiguous statutes" in a way that favors homosexu-
als, and the threat of discipline of judges could tip the balance in favor of 
homosexual litigants in discretionary cases. 
154. /d. at 34. 
155. /d. at 36-37. 
156. See Freeman, 507 F. Supp. at 706. See also Senator Jake Gam & Lincoln Oliphant, Dis-
qualification of Federal Judges under 28 U.S. C. § 455(a): Some Observations on and Objections to 
an Attempt by the United States Department of Justice to Disqualify a Judge on the Basis of His Re-
ligion and Church Position, 4 HARV. J .L. & Pus. POL'Y. I ( 1981 ). 
157. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reforms from Small Rules? Anti-Bias Canons as Sub-
stitutes for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363 (2000). 
158. See id. at 367. 
159. /d. at 365. 
160. /d. at 366-67. 
161. /d. at 368. 
162. See id. 
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Professor Brown argues that there are three kinds of bias that would 
be effected by Canon 3. The first is disrespect-meaning primarily name-
calling.163 This seems obvious, but Professor Brown muses that there 
may be more than just name-calling in this category because even the 
definitions judges use can "demean" homosexuals. She notes in a foot-
note: "For example, because many religious denominations currently 
celebrate marriages between people of the same sex, dictionaries defin-
ing marriage as a union between a man and a woman are arguably out of 
date. Courts citing such dictionaries as authority run the risk of adopting 
an obsolete definition of marriage." 164 
The second kind of bias Professor Brown identifies is when a judge's 
bias effects her fact-finding. 165 The archetypal instance of this bias ac-
cording to Professor Brown is the assumption that all homosexual per-
sons are engaged in sodomy. 166 She cites a dissent from a denial of cer-
tiorari written by Justice Rehnquist as an example. In that opinion, he 
expressed his opinion that a university should be allowed to ban a "gay" 
student group because its existence encouraged the violation of sodomy 
laws. 167 She also sees examples of this bias in cases where a homosexual 
parent is allowed child custody only when their same-sex partner is not 
present because of possible detrimental effect of the relationship on the 
children. 168 
To determine if this second type of bias is driving a decision, Profes-
sor Brown has outlined three possible manifestations of this kind of bias 
in court decisions. The first is where a judge takes judicial notice of facts 
not in the record that would be harmful to the homosexual person's 
claim. 169 An example would be where a New Jersey trial court judge (ac-
cording to Professor Brown) conflated James Dale's homosexuality in 
his role as a Boy Scout leader and his behavior outside of that role. 170 
Another of Professor Brown's examples involves a Pennsylvania case 
where limitations were placed on the rights of a lesbian mother because 
of concerns about the effect of her lifestyle on her children. This was ob-
163. See id. at 370. 
164. /d. at 385 n.88. 
165. See id. at 388-89. 
166. See id. at 390. 
167. /d. The case was Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). Professor Brown does not 
note that sodomy is a criminal offense in the jurisdiction involved in the case. See Mo. REV. STAT. ~ 
566.090 (2000). 
168. See Brown, supra note 158, at 392-93. 
169. See id. at 395. 
170. See id. at 399. Interestingly, Professor Brown argues that, "A judge who was free of such 
positive bias would see that the BSA literature did not disclose the fact that gay men were barred 
from membership in the organization." /d. at n.l51. This is, of course, a highly debatable presump-
tion. 
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jectionable to Professor Brown because the court assumed the relation-
ship would be harmful to the children. 171 Another example for Professor 
Brown is a Florida trial court's holding that a homosexual household is 
not a "traditional home environment" and that exposure to it could harm 
a child. 172 Professor Brown's solution to the problem of biased judicial 
notice is "to prohibit judges from taking judicial notice of facts about 
homosexuality to the detriment of gay or lesbian litigants." 173 
The next manifestation of fact-finding bias is what Professor Brown 
sees as acceptance of bad social science evidence about homosexuals. 174 
She cites as an example Justice Scalia's assertion in his Romer dissent 
that homosexuals may have a higher disposable income than others. 175 
The final manifestation of fact-finding bias is the use of group data about 
homosexuals to apply to individuallitigants. 176 
The third kind of bias Professor Brown identifies is bad application 
of laws. 177 In order for a judge to avoid this mistake, Professor Brown 
would require that a law relied on in a decision that would not benefit a 
homosexual litigant must be (1) "compelled by superior law" and (2) 
"clearly anti-gay." 178 Interestingly, Professor Brown gives the example of 
marriage recognition laws which provide that same-sex "marriages" from 
other jurisdictions will not be recognized outside of those jurisdictions as 
examples of laws that fit both criteria. 179 Professor Brown, however, does 
not believe many laws fit these criteria. She gives an example of a Dela-
ware judge rejecting a claim of harassment against one partner in a same-
sex couple and a Texas judge's reduced sentence because of the victims' 
homosexuality .180 To avoid the mistaken application of laws that are not 
clearly "anti-gay," Professor Brown would require that the statute in-
volved be clearly stated and that if discretion is allowed in the statute, 
homosexuality should not be taken into consideration as a negative fac-
tor.181 Her hypothetical example of the discretionary statute problem is 
that "sexual orientation" should not be considered negatively in a "best 
interests of the child" test for child custody or visitation, if not clearly re-
171. See id. at 40 l. 
172. See Brown. supra note 158, at 404. 
173. /d. at 405. 
174. See id. 
175. See id. at 409 n.l96. 
176. See id. at 41!. Parenthetically, Professor Brown believes Canon 3 could be used to ban 
peremptory challenges based on a juror's "sexual orientation." /d. at 413. 
177. Seeid.at4l6. 
!78. See Brown, supra note 158,. at 4!7. 
179. Seeid.at4l8. 
180. See id. at 420-21. 
181. See id. at 422. 
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quired by statute (i.e., it should be treated as equivalent to heterosexual-
ity).182 Later, Professor Brown argues that marriage also shouldn't be 
taken into consideration if it is considered superior to a "committed" 
same-sex relationship. 183 Another example of a mistaken application of a 
law would be cases where pre-nuptial-like contracts between same-sex 
couples are held to be not enforceable because they are based on an "il-
legal and immoral" relationship. 184 
Professor Brown also believes that not all "anti-gay" laws are "com-
pelled by superior law." 185 In fact, Professor Brown believes that past 
"anti-gay" decisions may be ignored especially if the decision was made 
before the jurisdiction's adoption of Canon 3 because the Canon is com-
peting law that must be reconciled with the decision, and the adoption of 
the Canon signals a changed circumstance that may make the previous 
decision inapplicable. 186 Along this line, Professor Brown argues that 
Canon 3 may justify reconsidering earlier precedent because it ( 1) less-
ens the degree to which people rely on that precedent, (2) indicates a 
separate development of law, and (3) signals an acceptance of homo-
sexuality that lessens the acceptance of the previous decision. 187 Adop-
tion of Canon 3 is a changed circumstance because it shows that the cli-
mate of "misinformation" that existed when the precedent was 
established has changed. 188 This would be especially true if the precedent 
was not established by the highest court in a jurisdiction. 189 This ap-
proach, according to Professor Brown, encourages judges to overrule 
precedent so a higher court can reconsider under Canon 3. 190 She notes 
that a radical interpretation of her test would require all pre-Canon 3 law 
implicating "sexual orientation" be invalidated. 191 Professor Brown be-
lieves that judges are not required to follow precedent they believe con-
flicts with Canon 3 and believes that Canon 3 could thus act like the Ro-
mer decision. 192 
Professor Brown believes that Canon 3 can also act as a "supple-
ment" to constitutionallaw.193 Professor Brown argues that this is better 
182. /d. at 424. 
183. See Brown, supra note 158, at 426 n.269. 
184. /d. at 426. 
185. !d. at 429. 
186. !d. 
187. See id. at 431. 
188. See Brown, supra note 158, at 431. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. at 432. 
191. /d. at 435. 
192. See id. at 435-37. 
193. /d. at 436. 
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than a constitutional decision like Romer because it is not limited to 
cases with facts similar to Romer. 194 She believes that Canon 3 could in-
validate many rationales for laws that are "anti-gay."195 She also notes 
that Romer can only result in the reversal of a decision, while Canon 3 
would threaten disciplinary sanctions for a judge. 196 
After again noting the potential reach of Canon 3 and possible reme-
dies for its violation (discipline and reversal), Professor Brown con-
cludes: "In the hands of vigilant advocates and conscientious judges, 
however, the Canon may yet do its greatest work."197 
There are at least two reasons to take Professor Brown's approach to 
anti-bias provisions very seriously. First, some courts have treated mar-
riage laws as discriminatory. 198 Second, there is really no competing 
analysis of these provisions, so their meaning may very well be open to 
this type of interpretation. 
VI. STAlE LEGAL ETHICS CODES 
Currently, sixteen States have language regarding "sexual orienta-
tion" in their legal ethics codes. 199 A few State provisions are contained 
in the rules governing the federal courts in the state. Most have adopted 
the same language: 
Litigation, inside and outside the courtroom . . . must be free from 
prejudice and bias in any form. Fair and equal treatment must be ac-
corded all courtroom participants, whether judges, attorneys, witnesses, 
litigants, jurors, or court personnel. The duty to be respectful of others 
includes the responsibility to avoid comment or behavior that can rea-
sonably be interpreted as manifesting prejudice or bias toward another 
on the basis of categories such as ... sexual orientation .... 200 
The Southern District of West Virginia rule states: "As to matters in is-
sue before the court, conduct and statements toward one another must be 
without bias with regard to such factors as ... sexual orientation when 
such conduct or statements bear no reasonable relationship to a good 
194. See id. 
195. /d. at 437. 
196. See id. at 439. 
197. /d. at 448. 
198. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44; Brause, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at * I; 
Tanner, 971 P.2d at 435; Baker, 744 A.2d at 864. 
199. The States are: Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, Washington, 
and West Virginia. 
200. U.S. BANKR. CT. RULES, D. Az. Rule 1000-19 (1996); U.S. DIST. CT. RULES, D. Az. 
Rule 1.20 (1994); U.S. DIST. & BANKR. CT., D. IDAHO Order 112 (1995); U.S. DIST. CT., W.O. 
WASH. Gen. Rule 9 (1994). 
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faith effort to argue or present a position on the merits."201 The rules for 
the Southern District of California state: "An attorney in practice before 
this court shall not . . . [ d]isparage any person's ... sexual orientation 
,202 
Thirteen state codes contain a variety of "sexual orientation" bias 
provisions. California rules require applicants for accreditation to pro-
vide specialty certification programs, for attorneys shall "not discrimi-
nate on the basis of ... sexual orientation ... against any attorney seek-
ing certification or reaccreditation."203 California rules also address 
lawyer referral service ("No referral shall discriminate on the basis of ... 
sexual orientation .... ")204 and the management of law practices ("In the 
management or operation of a law practice, a member shall not unlaw-
fully discriminate or knowingly permit unlawful discrimination on the 
basis of ... sexual orientation .... ").205 The Colorado rule states: "In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that exhibits 
or is intended to appeal to or engender bias against a person on account 
of that person[']s ... sexual orientation .... "206 The rule for D.C. pro-
vides: "A lawyer shall not discriminate against any individual in condi-
tions of employment because of the individual's ... sexual orientation 
.•.. "
207 The Florida rule states that it is misconduct to 
engage in any conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or 
through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate 
against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on 
any basis, including, but not limited to on account of ... sexual orienta-
tion .... 208 
Idaho's rule states that "a lawyer shall not use means that have no sub-
stantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, 
including conduct intended to appeal to or engender bias against a person 
on account of that person's ... sexual preference .... "209 The Massachu-
setts rule says that a lawyer must not "in appearing in a professional ca-
201. U.S. DIST. CT., S.D. W.VA. LR Gen. P. 3.02 (1994). 
202. U.S. DIST. CT., S.D. CALIF. Civ. R. 83.4 (1997). 
203. RULES GOVERNING ACCREDITATION OF SPECIALTY CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS FOR 
ATTORNEYS§ 4.0 (1997). 
204. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA PERTAINING TO LAWYER 
REFERRAL SERVICES Rule 13.2 (1997) (available online at <http://www.calbar.org/pub250/ 
lwyrrflr.htm> ). 
205. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 2-400 ( 1993). 
206. COLORADO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1993). 
207. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 9.1 (1995). 
208. FLORIDA STATE BAR RULE 4-8.4 (1993). 
209. IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4.4 (1998). 
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pacity before a tribunal, engage in conduct manifesting bias or prejudice 
based on ... sexual orientation .... "210 Massachusetts' rule also forbids 
discrimination by Clerk-Magistrates. 211 
Minnesota has four rules that address "sexual orientation" in some 
way. The purpose section of the criminal rules says that the rules "are in-
tended to provide for the just, speedy determination or criminal proceed-
ings without the purpose or effect of discrimination based upon ... sex-
ual orientation .... "212 Lawyers are admonished to "treat all parties, 
participants, other lawyers, and court personnel fairly and ... not dis-
criminate on the basis of ... sexual preference .... "213 Misconduct in-
cludes "harass[ing] a person on the basis of ... sexual preference ... in 
accordance with a lawyer's professional activities."214 Minnesota also 
forbids "sexual orientation" bias by neutrals in Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution. 215 In addition, in 1996, the Minnesota Supreme Court promul-
gated a new rule that required Minnesota attorneys to take two hours of 
courses "in the elimination of bias in the legal profession and in the prac-
tice of law."216 The course is defined as "a course directly related to the 
practice of law that is designed to educate attorneys to identify and 
eliminate from the legal profession and from the practice of law, biases 
. b f I . . "217 agamst persons ecause o ... sexua onentatwn .... 
New Jersey provides that it is misconduct for a lawyer to "engage, in 
a professional capacity, in conduct involving discrimination ... because 
of ... sexual orientation .... "218 New Mexico states: "In the course of 
any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal, a lawyer shall 
refrain from intentionally manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or 
prejudice based on ... sexual orientation .... "219 The Ohio provision 
says, "A lawyer shall not engage, in a professional capacity, in conduct 
involving discrimination prohibited by law because ... of sexual orienta-
tion .... "220 Texas states, "A lawyer shall not wilfully, in connection 
with an adjudicatory proceeding, except as provided in paragraph (b) 
[which makes exceptions for choosing to represent a client], manifest, by 
210. MASSACHUSETT'S RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3:07 (1992). 
211. MASSACHUSETT'S CLERK'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1990). 
212. MINNESOTA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 1.02 {1994). 
213. MINNESOTA GEN. RULES OF PRACTICE Rule 2.03 (1997). 
214. MINNESOTA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 8.4 ( 1990). 
215. MINNESOTA GEN. RULES OF PRACTICE Rule 114 {1997). 
216. Supreme Court Order Regarding Elimination of Bias and Ethics, Case #C2-84-2163 
(Minn. June 28, 1996) <www.minncle.org/supremecourtorder.htm>. 
217. /d. 
218. NEW. JERSEY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1990). 
219. NEW. MEXICO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 16-300 (1995). 
220. OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1994). 
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words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on ... sexual orientation to-
wards any person involved in that proceeding in any capacity."221 Ver-
mont's rule provides that "A lawyer shall not ... [d]iscriminate against 
any individual because of his or her ... sexual orientation ... in hiring, 
promoting or otherwise determining the conditions of employment of 
that individual."222 The Washington provision says that it is misconduct 
to "[c]ommit a discriminatory act prohibited by law on the basis of ... 
sexual orientation ... where the act is committed in connection with the 
I , ~ . I . . . ,223 awyer s pro1esswna acttv1ttes. -
New York's misconduct provision states, "A lawyer of law firm shall 
not ... [u]nlawfully discriminate in the practice of law, including in hir-
ing, promoting or otherwise determining conditions of employment on 
the basis of ... sexual orientation .... "224 Attorneys in New York are 
also required to provide for potential clients a "Statement of Client's 
Rights and Responsibilities" which says: "An attorney may not refuse to 
represent you on the basis of ... sexual orientation .... "225 
A number of local California jurisdictions also have bias provisions 
related to "sexual orientation." The Contra Costa County Superior Court 
rules provide: "No attorney shall engage in any act of ... sexual orienta-
tion . . . bias while engaging in the practice of law in Contra Costa 
County."226 In Sacramento County, the rule states "Lawyers shall not en-
gage in any act of bias based on ... sexual orientation ... while engag-
ing in the practice of law, and should work towards the elimination of 
bias in all aspects of the justice system."227 The rules further provide 
Lawyers shall (a) Treat opposing counsel with respect and courtesy re-
gardless of ... sexual orientation ... (b) Not attempt to take advantage 
of or intimidate another lawyer on account of ... sexual orientation ... 
(c) Not tolerate bias or prejudice by another attorney or by the court 
and should take appropriate steps to prevent an occurrence of such be-
havior in the future (d) Refrain from making any statement or com-
ment, whether publicly or privately, which serves to denigrate any 
other lawyer, judicial officer or member of the public on the basis of 
... sexual orientation.228 
San Francisco County's provisions state that "all judicial officers, coun-
sel, courtroom clerks, court reporters, bailiffs, jurors, court support staff 
221. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCf Rule 5.08 (1994). 
222. VERMONT CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 {1998). 
223. WASHINGTON RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (enacted 1993). 
224. NEW YORK CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1996). 
225. NEW YORK CT. RULES,§§ 1210.1 & 1400.2 {1998). 
226. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY. PROF'L COURTESY STANDARDS Standard 3 (1994). 
227. SACRAMENTO COUNTY. BAR ASS'N. STANDARDS OF PROF'L CONDUCf § 3 (1994). 
228. !d. 
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and all participants in judicial proceedings shall refrain from engaging in 
any conduct, including comments, which exhibits bias or prejudice based 
on ... sexual orientation ... except where such conduct is relevant to the 
issues in the courtroom proceeding."229 The rule for Santa Barbara says: 
"A lawyer shall not engage in derogatory conduct that has as its basis the 
. . . sexual orientation or other immutable characteristics of any per-
son."230 Finally, Siskiyou County requires court employees to "[g]uard 
against and, when necessary, repudiate any acts of discrimination or bias 
based on ... sexual orientation .... "231 
As with the judicial anti-bias provisions, there is not much case law 
to help determine the effects of these provisions, but this section could 
have some of the same problematic possibilities as described in the Judi-
cial Codes section. (Section 5B supra). 
VII. LAW SCHOOLS 
The legal academic community seems to be at the forefront of the 
embracing of ideologies related to "sexual orientation."232 One law stu-
dent at Boalt Hall, University of California (Berkeley) complained: 
"[C]learly and loudly, the raised voices in favor of homosexual rights at 
Boalt have chilled contrary speech through intolerance of contrary views 
.... [S]tudents who individually challenge the dominant paradigm with 
their own thoughts are ostracized by many other students at the law 
school-perhaps intentionally, perhaps unintentionally."233 The Law 
School Admission Council ("LSAC") even publishes a brochure for 
"Lesbian, Gay and Transgendered Applicants" to law schools.234 
229. SAN FRANCISCO SUPER. CT. RULES Rule 19 (enacted 1996); CALIFORNIA ORDER 98-84 
( 1998); LoCAL RULES FOR THE MUN. CT. OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Rule 207 
(1998). 
230. SANTA BARBARA COUNTY SUPER. CT. RULES App. (1996). 
231. UNIFIED LoCAL CT. RULES FOR SISKIYOU COUNTY App. 2 ( 1996). 
232. This may reflect a larger trend in the field of higher education. See Kelly Sullivan, Put-
ting the "Liberal" in Liberal Arts (visited Feb. 18, 2000) <www.heritage.org>; NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, NATIONAL FACULTY SURVEY REGARDING THE USE OF SEXUAL AND 
RACIAL PREFERENCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1996). 
233. Nick-Anthony Buford, What Ever Happened to J.S. Mill?, POL'Y REV., June-July 1999. 
Another writer has identified a similar trend in the academy's overwhelming support of abortion on 
demand. See Norah Vincent, Partisan Review, VILLAGE VOICE, June 21-27, 2000. 
234. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, OUT AND lN (brochure available at 
<www.lsac.org>) (hereinafter OUT AND IN). 
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A. Association of American Law Schools 
1. Bylaws 
The bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") 
includes a "Diversity" provision, which states: 
a. A member school shall provide equality of opportunity in legal edu-
cation for all persons including faculty and employees with respect to 
hiring, continuation, promotion and tenure, applicants for admission, 
enrolled students, and graduates, without discrimination or segregation 
on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, handi-
cap or disability, or sexual orientation. 
b. A member school shall pursue a policy of providing its students and 
graduates with equal opportunity to obtain employment without dis-
crimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, sex, age, handicap or disability, or sexual orientation.235 
The procedures of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
makes allowances for religiously affiliated law schools in regard to this 
provision.236 Specifically, it allows "law schools with a religious affilia-
tion or purpose to adopt preferential admissions and employment prac-
tices that directly relate to the school's religious affiliation or purpose" if 
( 1) notice is provided, (2) the school's ability to provide a quality educa-
tion is not inhibited, (3) the Committee's principles of academic freedom 
are not interfered with, (4) "the practices do not discriminate on the 
grounds of race, color, national origin, sex, age, handicap or disability, or 
sexual orientation," and (5) the school does not make a "blanket exclu-
sion nor limitation on the number of persons admitted or employed on 
1. . d ,217 re tgwus groun s. -
AALS 's interpretive principles for religiously-affiliated member 
schools in regard to these two provisions state that it "seek[s] to strike a 
fair and sensitive balance between the values of religious liberty and 
nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation."238 The preface to the 
235. Association of American Law Schools, BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW SCHOOLS, Section 6-4 (amended through Jan. 5, 1997) <www.aals.org/bylaws/ 
html>. 
236. For a helpful discussion of problems with the application of this standard to religiously-
affiliated law schools, see Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation: What's "Religious Di-
versity" Got to Do With It?, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 427,473-477 (1995). 
237. Association of American Law Schools, Procedures for Committee on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure, Section 6.17 (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <www.aals.org/chapter6.html>. 
238. Association of American Law Schools, Interpretive Principles to Guide Religiously-
Affiliated Member Schools as They Implement Bylaw 6-4(a) and Executive Committee Regulation 
6.17 (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <www.aals.org/interp.html> (hereinafter AALS Interpretive Principles). 
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principles further provides: "When applied to religiously affiliated 
schools, that absolute protection of the status of sexual orientation con-
tinues, but in the unique context of religious liberty, Bylaw 6-4(a) and 
ECR 6.17 should be interpreted to permit the regulation of conduct when 
that conduct is directly incompatible with the essential religious tenets 
and values of a member school."239 The third principle states: 
No individual or organization of students, staff, or faculty should suffer 
disadvantage solely because of the status of the individual's sexual ori-
entation or the organization's focus on the subject of sexual orientation. 
Recognition of individual dignity and the need for all persons to coexist 
require all institutions to refrain from discrimination based solely on 
the identified status of an individual or on an organization's focus on 
the subject of sexual orientation. This principle recognizes that stu-
dents, staff, and faculty have a right to establish such organizations. At 
the same time, however, religiously affiliated institutions which have 
core values directed toward conduct within their communities are enti-
tled to protect those values if they do so in a manner consistent with 
. . I #4 b I " 240 pnnCip e e ow. 
Principle 4 provides that when 
a school finds that the conduct of an individual or organization conflicts 
with the religious values of the school, the school shall make a good 
faith examination whether and in what ways it can accommodate the 
rights of the individual or the organization under Bylaw 6-4(a) consis-
tent with the school's essential religious tenets, and it shall act accord-
. I 241 
mg y. 
That this principle is meant to make possible religious exemptions to the 
non-discrimination policy outlined in 6-4(a) as narrow as possible is evi-
dent in the language of the commentary on the principle: 
The key to coexistence and tolerance between groups of divergent be-
liefs is the willingness to try to accommodate each other's beliefs to the 
fullest extent possible. In affirming the essential importance of both re-
ligious liberty and nondiscrimination, this principle provides that relig-
iously affiliated schools will periodically review and evaluate their 
policies and procedures so that exclusion of members from or limita-
tion on the participation of members within the law school community 
based upon conduct occurs only to the extent necessary, in compelling 
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Notice that although the principle calls for accommodating others' be-
liefs to the fullest extent possible, it only seems to really apply when the 
belief being accommodated potentially interferes with the religious mis-
sion of the school, since these should be subject to limitation (according 
to this principle) "only to the extent necessary, in compelling circum-
d h . l 1· . . h I "243 AI stances, an w en essentla re Igious tenets reqmre sue a resu t. · -
though the principle "is not designed to suggest the appropriate outcome 
of any particular conflict," it does lean heavily towards requiring ac-
commodation by the school rather than the dissenting individual or 
group. As the commentary states: "[l]t does impose a good faith obliga-
tion on the institution to make whatever accommodations appear feasible 
under the circumstances presented."244 This stingy reading of accommo-
dation is particularly unaccommodating when "sexual orientation" is at 
issue. The commentary continues: "Moreover, if the essential religious 
tenets lead to a prohibition of all nonmarital sexual conduct, the school 
must, nevertheless, comply with Bylaw 6-4(a), which prohibits differ-
ences in treatment based on sexual orientation."245 
The fifth principle also tries to narrow the effect of a school's reli-
gious tenets on the AALS nondiscrimination policy by requiring schools 
"to give clear notice of the religious tenets and values of the institution to 
prospective members of the law school community prior to their affilia-
tion with the school."246 The comment adds: "In this regard, if the school 
has a conduct code that implicates the concerns addressed in these Inter-
pretive Principles (including a ban on all nonmarital sexual conduct), the 
school's bulletin and admissions material should state these restrictions 
clearly so as to avoid misunderstanding."247 
While there is not an abundance of information on the application of 
these regulations, the Academic Vice-President of Brigham Young Uni-
versity noted that when the AALS conducted a reaccreditation review of 
the J. Reuben Clark Law School, the University "explained that our ap-
proach is to avoid demeaning others but to be clear that sexual activity 
outside the bounds of a duly authorized heterosexual marriage would not 
be accepted. [University officials] also suggested that those who fo-
mented in favor of such behavior would be subject to discipline."248 The 
law school was reaccredited. 





248. Alan L. Wilkins, Becomin~: a Light That is a Standard to the Nations, BRIGHAM YOUNG 
UNIVERSITY SPEECHES 1998-99, at 6 (Aug. 23, 1999). 
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2. Section on Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 
The AALS has one section devoted to "Lesbian and Gay Legal Is-
sues."249 The section maintains a mentoring program and a website 
<www.cwsl.edu/aalsqueer>, as well as an email discussion list available 
IS . b 250 on y to ectton mem ers. 
At the most recent AALS meeting in New Orleans, section discus-
sion was dominated by efforts to repeal the Solomon Amendment which 
allows military recruiters to use law school facilities despite the mili-
tary's policy prohibiting openly homosexual members?51 In fact, the 
Solomon Amendment consumes a great deal of attention by the section. 
The section is dedicated to minimizing the access of the military to law 
schools, ameliorating the effect of Solomon, and working to repeal the 
amendment.252 At the New Orleans meeting, the section decided to work 
with the office of Representative Barney Frank to begin a letter-writing 
effort in behalf of repeal. 253 
A supplemental report on Solomon was also adopted by the section 
at this meeting.254 The supplemental report describes the regulations and 
outlines the section's objective, to "avoid uncompelled complicity" with 
the regulations.255 The appendix contains a letter from Carl Monk, then 
Executive Director of AALS, to deans of member schools.256 The letter 
said that member schools would be "free to choose whether to continue 
to comply with the bylaw requirements as it applies to the military. 
Schools that choose not to comply will have their noncompliance ex-
cused so long as they engage in appropriate activities to ameliorate the 
negative effects that granting access to the military has on the quality of 
the learning environment for its students, particularly its gay and lesbian 
students."257 AALS later shared possible amelioration strategies with the 
258 deans. In August 1998, Carl Monk sent another memo to deans offer-
ing them the opportunity to participate in a legal challenge to the regula-
249. Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <www.aals.org/sections/gl.html>. 
250. See AALS SECTION ON GAY & LESBIAN LEGAL ISSUES, SECTION NEWSLETTER (Spring 
1998) (hereinafter NEWSLETTER). 
251. See id. 
252. /d. 
253. See National Lesbian and Gay Law Association, Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Is-
sues Addresses Full Agenda at Annual AALS Meeting (Jan. II, 1999) <www.nlgla.org/news/ 
item_AALS.html>. 
254. See NEWSLETTER, supra note 251. 
255. AALS SECTION ON GAY & LESBIAN LEGAL ISSUES, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT (Dec. 15, 
1998). 
256. See id. 
257. !d. 
258. See AALS, Memorandum 98-23 (May 14, 1998). 
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tions that would be staged by Matt Coles, Director of the ACLU' s Les-
bian and Gay Rights Project.259 
The section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues cooperated with the 
Executive Director's office in regard to the response to the regulations, 
urging a strenuous effort to encourage grudging compliance. 260 The sec-
tion also sent out a questionnaire regarding law school response to the 
regulations in early 1999 to provide information on how law schools can 
I. h I . ' f'C 261 arne wrate t e regu atwns e 1ect. 
B. Organizations at Individual Law Schools 
Lambda lists the Newark Urban Legal Clinic at the Rutgers School 
of Law as a signatory to its Marriage Resolution.262 Similarly, the Bisex-
ual, Gay and Lesbian Law Student Association at the University of Vir-
ginia published a statement in support of same-sex "marriage."263 In the 
Florida case, Lofton v. Butterworth,264 challenging Florida's adoption 
statute which does not allow adoption by homosexuals, the Children First 
Project at the Shephard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastern Univer-
sity is participating by representing children currently in homes with ho-
mosexual parents who are seeking to have the adoption ban invali-
dated.Z65 A 1990 study by AALS determined that 48% of participating 
schools had "gay and lesbian" student groups.266 A I 992 study by Steven 
Hartwell of the University of San Diego found that 63% of responding 
schools had such groups.267 The Law School Admissions Council 
(LSAC) reports that of the 169 law schools that responded to their survey 
regarding schools with homosexual student organizations, 127 (about 
75%) had such organizations.268 
259. AALS, Memorandum 98-37 (August 20, 1998). 
260. See Letter from Francisco Valdez, 1997 Section Chair to Carl C. Monk, Executive Direc-
tor of AALS (Sep. 17, 1997) and Response from Carl Monk (Oct. I, 1997). 
261. See SECTION ON GAY AND lESBIAN LEGAL ISSUES, SOLOMON II QUESTIONNAIRE. 
262. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Marrial{e Resolution: Selected Sil{nato-
ries (Mar. 22, 1999) <www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record= 142>. 
263. BGALLSA, Ril{ht to Marry (Oct. 6, 1998) <www.student.Virginia.edu/-bgallsa/ 
marriage.htm>. 
264. 93 F. Supp. 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
265. See ACLU, ACLU Challenl{es Florida Ban on Lesbian and Gay Adoption (May 26, 
1999) <www.aclu.org/features/f052699a.html>. 
266. See Steven Hartwell, What a Difference a Gay Makes: An Empirical Study of the Impact 
of 'Out' Gay Law Faculty on Law School Curriculum and Policies. I NAT'L. J. OF SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION L. 227, 228 (1995). 
267. See id. 
268. See OUT AND IN, supra note 255. 
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C. Curriculum 
Of the top eleven law schools in the U.S. News and World Report's 
Graduate Schools Ranking (eleven because of two ties), ten of the 
schools have courses specifically addressing issues of homosexuality or 
sexual orientation, according to online course listings: Yale, Harvard, 
Stanford, NYU, Columbia, University of Chicago, University of Vir-
ginia, Duke University, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, and Univer-
sity of California-Berkeley. The other school in this list, Cornell Univer-
sity, does not appear to have such a course. 
I. Yale 
One of Yale's courses is called "Theorizing Sexuality" taught by the 
gay legal scholar Kenji Yoshino.269 The online course catalog describes it 
as follows: 
In explaining why he embarked upon the study of sexuality and its 
regulation, Judge Richard Posner described his "belated discovery that 
judges know next to nothing about the subject beyond their own per-
sonal experience, which is limited, perhaps more so than average, be-
cause people with irregular sex lives are pretty much (not entirely, of 
course) screened out of the judiciary." This judicial ignorance about 
sexuality, which is arguably a manifestation of a more general legal ig-
norance, becomes all the more troubling when measured against bur-
geoning cultural knowledge about the subject. This writing seminar 
will attempt to close the gap between legal and cultural knowledge of 
sexuality in three ways. First, we will read nonlegal scholars of sexual-
ity, including Leo Bersani, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Marjorie 
Garber, and Eve Sedgwick. Second, we will examine how the insights 
of these scholars have been assimilated (or not) into law. In so doing, 
we will look at both the case law and the work of such legal academics 
as William Eskridge, Katherine Franke, Janet Halley, and Kendall 
Thomas. Finally, each student will present his or her own work relating 
to sexuality and the law-orally during the term and in written form at 
its conclusion.270 
It is interesting to note that this course requires a prerequisite of "an in-
troductory course in sexuality and the law [or] sexual orientation and the 
269. For scholarly articles authored by Kenji Yoshino, see Assimilationist Bias in Equal Pro-
tection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485 
(1998); The Lawyer l!{ Belmont, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 183 (1997); Suspect Symbols: The Lit-
erary Ar.~:ument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L.REV. 1753 (1996); What's Past is 
Prologue: Precedent in Literature and Law, 104 YALE L.J. 471 (1994). 
270. Yale Course Offerings 1999 Spring Term (visited Feb. I, 2001) <www.yale.edu/ 
lawweb/lawfac>. 
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law".271 The obvious implication of this description is that the opinions 
of the judiciary on issues of sexuality are not yet as advanced as those of 
elite culture, and this is a problem that should be fixed (presumably by 
the enlightened students of courses such as this one). 
2. Harvard 
Harvard's course is called "Law, Sex and Identity" and is taught by 
Dan Danielsen.272 
3. Stanford 
The course at Stanford taught by Matthew Coles is "Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law."273 
4. NYU 
NYU Law School's course, taught by Paula Ettelbrick,274 is called 
"Sexuality and the Law." Its course description describes it as follows: 
This course begins with the development of constitutional, medical and 
theoretical constructions of sexuality. The question of how state regula-
tions and legal analysis promote or reflect certain views of sexuality, 
gender and sexual orientation is central to discussion and study. The 
later part of the course applies this background to three specific institu-
tional contexts in which the social rules of sexuality and gender are 
challenged and changed through the leBa! process: the military, mar-
riage and the family, and the workplace. 5 
5. Columbia 
Columbia offers a course called "Topics in Law and Sexuality", but 
the online course guide does not provide a description of the course.276 
271. !d. 
272. Francisco Valdes, Tracking and Assessing the (Non)lnclusion of Courses on Sexuality 
and/or Sexual Orientation in the American Law School Curriculum, I NAT'L. J. OF SEXUAL 
0RIENTATIONL.I50, I75(1995). 
273. !d. at 185. Matthew Coles is the Director of the ACLU's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project. 
274. Paula Ettelbrick has written Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Rec-
ognition, 5 J.L. & PoL'Y 107 (I996); Not All Speech is Equal: Some Thoughts on Lesbians, Free 
Speech and Harassment, 3 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 59 (1994); Who is a Parent?: The 
Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, I 0 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 5I3 (I993). 
275. NYU Law Course Listings (visited Mar. IO, 200I) <www.law.nyu.edu/ 
recordsregistrationlfall99/108.html#3509>. NYU began offering a seminar on the issue called "Sexu-
ality and the Law" in I980 at the request of members of Lesbian and Gay Law Students. See Robert 
Murphy, The Personal is the Pedagogical: A Very Brief Life of Professor Stoddard, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1027, 1030 (I997). 
276. Columbia Law School Curriculum (visited Feb. I, 200I) <www.columbia.edu/ 
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6. University of Chicago 
The relevant course at the University of Chicago is not devoted 
solely to issues of homosexuality but lumps them in with other subjects. 
It is called "Workshop in Critical Legal Theory," and the course descrip-
tion says: "In this workshop, scholars will present and discuss their work 
in critical race, feminist, and lesbian-gay legal theory, considering how 
changing views of race, gender, and sexuality may reshape law and legal 
institutions. "277 
7. University of Virginia 
The University of Virginia also offers a class addressing issues of 
homosexuality as part of a discussion of other topics. The course, called 
"Regulating the Family, Sex, and Gender," 
[c]onsiders how we police the practices of family, sex, and gender and 
why we regulate them the way we do. Discusses social theory, legal 
theory, feminist theory, gay and lesbian theory, and others. Issues relat-
ing to sex discrimination, reproductive rights, gay and lesbian rights, 
and traditional family law are covered. Examines to what extent the le-
gal regime views sex, gender, and the family as interdependent social 
institutions and how it approaches them together.278 
8. Duke University 
The long description of Duke's course, "Sexuality and the Law," 
provides an interesting look at the genre of similar courses: 
This is a seminar about how sexuality affects the structure and en-
forcement of legal rules and regimes, and how sexual orientation influ-
ences the application of legal rules to individuals in our society. 
Courses about sexuality and the law are relatively new attempts to ex-
amine legal questions. Most courses take one of three paths. The most 
common path is to look at how political equality is extended to gays, 
lesbians, bisexuals and other sexual minorities. Courses in this group 
tend to be constitutional law courses about sexual orientation. The sec-
ond kind of sexuality and the law course is one that attempts to use the 
historical, sociological and political theory that has come to be called 
Queer theory. Courses developed around Queer theory look at the dif-
ferences that exist in sexual communities and among individuals with 
cu/lawlbulletinl>. 
277. University of Chicago Law School Course Offerings (Jan. 31, 2001) 
<www.law.uchicago.edu/Studentlcourses4.html>. 
278. University of Virginia School of Law Graduate Record Course Descriptions (Jan. 31, 
200 I )<http://www .law. virginia.edunawweb/lawweb2.nsf/pages/lev2calc?OpenDocument&Fr I =in de 
xview/5Academics&Fr2=/lawweb\lawweb2.nsf/pages/Lawlndex>. 
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different sexual orientation. In this kind of sexuality course the key 
question is how much legal respect to give difference in sexual, gender, 
and status of sexual minorities. In short to what extent can the law re-
quire sexual assimilation. The third kind of course ... doesn't directly 
engage differences of queer theory or the constitutionalism of the first 
kind. The first two kinds of sexuality and the law courses are concerned 
about contrasting political visions of the law. The last kind of course is 
about sexual orientation and the practicing lawyer. This course will ad-
dress all three of these issues examining the constitutional law ques-
tions around equal protection and marriage, custody, and political par-
ticipation, and using queer theory to illuminate the ways that law is 
constructed to limit the lives of "sexual difference." In addition, this 
course will try to provide the outlines of a practical guide to providing 
legal help to lesbian, gay and other sexual minorities. This course will 
start by examining how race and gender helped to define sexuality and 
limit the structure of legal rules in immigration, naturalization, mar-
riage and sexual rules in the 18th and 19th centuries. This course will 
attempt to examine how sexual orientation is similar to and different 
from the uses of gender and race and their intersections in legal dis-
course, and examine in detail the legal arguments behind marriage and 
the legal arguments behind political participation suggested by Romer 
v. Evans and the Defense of Marriage Act. Much of this course will 
center around discussions of gay, lesbian and bisexuality, but the 
'II d . h . h I' 279 course WI en wit a sectiOn on eterosexua 1ty. 
9. University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
The University of Michigan offers two courses dealing with homo-
sexuality and the law. One of these, "Sexuality And The Law," is also 
taught by Paula Ettelbrick. The course description says: "This course ex-
plores the limits of the state's power to regulate sexuality by reviewing 
the 'morality debate,' the influence of medicine and science in defining 
sex, gender and sexuality, theories of sexuality and gender, and the de-
velopment of the legal and cultural constructions of sexuality."280 
The other course is called "Sexual Orientation and the Law." Its de-
scription reads: 
This seminar will examine the relationship between sexual orientation 
and the law. We will focus on the interaction between the law and 
broader attitudes about sexual orientation by closely examining how 
social, cultural and political forces shape, and are shaped by, legal doc-
279. Duke University School of Law Curriculum (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <www.law.duke.edu/ 
curriculurn!coursesFrame.html>. 
280. University of Michigan-Ann Arbor Law School Course Descriptions (visited Jan. 31, 
200 I) <www .law .umich.edu/cfusionltemplate/course.dbm ?CourseiD=780F99>. 
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trine. Within this rubric, we will explore subjects across many tradi-
tional legal domains-including constitutional, criminal, family and 
antidiscrimination law. We will cover, for example, regulation of sexu-
ality and sexual identity; legal recognition of gay and lesbian families 
and relationships; the debate over gay civil rights legislation; and poli-
cies relating to gays in the military, sexuality and schools, and other 
matters of contemporary controversy. As we explore these subjects, we 
will situate the le~al questions within larger theoretical debates about 
law and equality? 1 
10. University of California-Berkeley 
Berkeley's course, taught by Kathryn Kendel1,282 is called "Sexual-
ity, Gender and the Law." It is described as follows: 
This course is designed to explore the relationship between sexual ori-
entation, gender, nonconformity and law. The course will examine 
various legal principles which might be used to limit the ability of gov-
ernment and other institutions to disadvantage people because of their 
sexual orientation. There will be a special emphasis on constitutional 
doctrines, including equal protection and due process/privacy. The 
course will look at how courts have used these doctrines to help-or 
more often not to help-lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender 
individuals in critical aspects of their lives (employment, housing, fam-
ily relationships, etc.). The course will take a hard look at the philoso-
phy which informs each doctrine to see if law ought to be helpful in 
coping with sexual orientation discrimination, and issues of gender. Fi-
nally, the course will identify practical problems in making legal policy 
about sexual orientation, and examine how the philosophical conclu-
sions of the first part might be used in day to day litigation and policy 
k. 283 rna mg. 
Of the few courses listed which have instructors named all are 
openly homosexual and a number are important activists, such as Matt 
Coles, Paula Ettelbrick, and Kathryn Kendell.284 
28!. University (if Michigan-Ann Arbor Law School Course Descriptions (visited Feb. I, 
200 I) <www.law.umich.edu/cfusion!template/course.dbm?CourseiD=886W99>. 
282. Kathryn Kendell is the Executive Director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights. She 
teaches "sexual orientation" and the law courses at U.C. Berkeley and Hastings College of Law. 
NCLR, About NCLR (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <www.nclrights.org/staffbio.html>. 
283. U.C.Berkeley (Feb.!, 2001)<www.law.berkeley.edu/cgi-
bin!courses/descrptn. pi ?course=286.8&semester=Spring&year= 1998>. 
284. Arguably the most important legal activist on the issue of same-sex "marriage," Evan 
Wolfson (co-counsel in Baehr v. Anderson and Dale v. Boy Scouts (if America), Director of Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, is an adjunct professor at Columbia University Law School. 
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Professor Francisco Valdes has reported on a survey of law schools 
regarding "sexual orientation" courses in the curriculum.285 He surveyed 
100% of the AALS member schools and found that "66 of 176 American 
law schools-over one third of the total-have made room in their curricu-
lum for course(s) that are primarily devoted, or substantially related, to 
this subject" of "sexual orientation."286 He concludes: "These results, in 
other words, depict a definite but limited penetration of the curriculum 
and activities of the American law school."287 Professor Valdes notes, 
though, that the schools with these programs are "concentrated in schools 
located along the East and West coasts, or schools located in urban, met-
ropolitan areas, or in schools that are relatively prominent and prestig-
ious."288 In a more recent study, the Law School Admissions Council re-
ports that 94 schools have such courses-about 55% of the schools which 
d d . f . f . 289 respon e to Its request or m ormatiOn. 
Professor Valdes notes that each of the courses has a cross-
disciplinary approach to the issue and that the courses generally concen-
trate on constitutional law and family law?90 
One school, Northeastern University School of Law in Massachu-
setts, has a first year course called "Law, Culture and Difference" which 
has a segment addressing "sexual orientation and the family."291 At Stan-
ford in 1990, faculty and students compiled materials on "sexual orienta-
tion" to supplement textbooks of law school courses.292 
D. Faculty and Other Academic Indicators 
Professor Alex M. Johnson argues that "gay and lesbian" faculty 
"have had a transformative impact on the scholarship that is produced by 
the academy. "293 Steven Hartwell found in a I 992 study that there seems 
to be a positive correlation between "openly gay" faculty at a law school 
and that law school having student groups for homosexuals, having a 
policy prohibiting "sexual orientation" discrimination, and having classes 
on "sexual orientation" in the curriculum.294 The Law Schools Admission 
285. See Valdes, supra note 273, at 150. 
286. /d. at 152. The schools are listed in Appendix I. 
287. !d. at 153. 
288. !d. 
289. OUT AND IN, supra note 235. 
290. See Francisco Valdes, supra note 253, at 164. 
291. Elaine Walsh, New Faculty, Moot-Court Room Added to NV Law, MASS. LAW. WKLY., 
April 13, 1992, at S7. 
292. Valdes, supra note 253, at 224-225 n.38. 
293. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Scholarship in a Diverse Legal Academy: Incorporating Outsiders' 
Perspectives (visited Jan. 31, 200 I) <www.aals.org/johnson.htmi>. 
294. See Hartwell, supra note 267, at 227. 
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Council reported that 64% (108 schools) of schools responding to its 
survey had an "openly gay" faculty member.295 Major activists for "gay 
rights" and same-sex "marriage" are on the faculty of law schools. As 
noted above, these include Evan Wolfson, Matt Coles, Paula Ettelbrick 
and Kathryn Kendell. In addition, Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund recently announced that Suzanne Goldberg, a staff attorney who 
had worked for the organization since 1991 (including by playing a role 
in the Romer litigation), would be leaving to take a faculty position at the 
Rutgers University Law School.296 
There have also been a number of academic conferences sponsored 
by law schools which address same-sex "marriage" and related issues. 
Harvard Law School297 and Vermont Law Schooe98 have both featured 
conferences supporting same-sex "marriage." Also, in July 1999, anum-
ber of American law professors participated in an international confer-
ence on the recognition of same-sex partnerships.299 On 19-21 November 
1997, the Catholic University of America sponsored a conference (with 
co-sponsorship by the Howard University School of Law and the J. Reu-
ben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University) on the ground-
breaking "right to marry" case, Loving v. Virginia, which rebutted uses 
of the analogy of same-sex "marriage" and interracial marriage?00 In 
June 1998, Creighton Law School hosted a Conference on Interjurisdic-
tional Marriage Recognition (co-sponsored by the Columbus School of 
Law at The Catholic University of America and the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School at Brigham Young University) which discussed whether same-
sex "marriages" contracted in one state must be recognized in other 
states.301 
In 1995, the National Journal of Sexual Orientation Law (an online 
legal journal published by the University of North Carolina) published a 
special issue regarding issues related to homosexuals in law schools 
which included discussions on "openly gay" faculty, sexual orientation 
classes in law schools, and the experiences of "openly gay law stu-
dents."302 
295. OUT AND IN, supra note 235. 
296. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Long-Time Litigator in Lesbian, Gay 
Civil Rights Leaves Lambda Legal Defense (June 22, 2000). 
297. See Freedom to Marry Conference (Feb. 13, 1999). 
298. See Fifth Annual Sexual Orientation and the Law Conference (Mar. 19, 1999). 
299. See Legal Recognition of Same-sex Partnerships: A Conference on National, European 
and International Law (July 1-3, 1999). 
300. Conference Papers were published in volume 47 of the Catholic University Law Review, 
volume 12 of the B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law, and volume 41 of the Howard Law Journal. 
30 I. The papers presented at this conference were published in volume 32 of the Creighton 
Law Review. 
302. See Mary Becker, Becoming Visible, I NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 147 (1995). 
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In regards to law review literature on the specific issue of same-sex 
"marriage," Professor Lynn Wardle noted in an article in 1996 that 
between 1990 and June 1995, only one of seventy-two articles, notes, 
comments, or essays focusing primarily on same-sex marriage (only 1.4 
%) fully defended the heterosexuality requirement for marriage (though 
it did so on religious, rather than legal, grounds). Only two other law 
review pieces about same-sex marriage published during that period 
primarily criticized constitutional arguments for same-sex marriage, 
while at least as many others attacked marriage as an institution for 
same-sex, as well as heterosexual, couples. All of the other (sixty-nine) 
pieces advocated, supported, or were generally sympathetic to same-
sex marriage. Thus, the defense of the unique legal status of heterosex-
ual marriage clearly has not been fairly or adequately presented in the 
law reviews?03 
Since 1996, a conservative estimate is that there have been thirty seven 
law review articles written which reflect the point of view of reaffirming 
marriage and 106 which support the redefinition of marriage to include 
same-sex couples. Even when journals publish articles defending mar-
riage, there have been instances when the journal either solicited or pub-
lished rebuttals to the original article.304 
The contributions by the law students were particularly interesting. Both had attended Harvard Law 
School and had a similar experience-they felt the student body and faculty were too conservative 
and felt "marginalized" because of their homosexuality. There is very little that is different from 
these accounts and the most famous account of a first year at Harvard Law School, ScoTT TUROW, 
ONE-L (1977), other than the homosexuality of the narrators. One senses in reading them that there 
may be something about Harvard Law School that provokes a particularly strong response from first 
year students (or maybe it is just the nature of law school in general). See Brad Sears, Queer L, l 
NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 235 (1995); Kevin S. Reuther, Dorothy's Friend Goes to Law 
School, I NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 254 (1995). 
303. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claimf j(>r Same-Sex MarriaJ;e 
1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. I, 18-20 (1996). 
304. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice": MarriaJ;e and the 
Realization that Principles Win Over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293 (1996) (responding to a 
rebuttal of her original article, The Homosexual "Union": Should Gay and Lesbian Partnerships be 
Granted the Same Status as Marriage?, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 51 (1996), by Kathryn Dean Kendell, 
Principles and Prejudice: Lesbian and Gay Civil Marriage and the Realization of Equality, 22 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 81 (1996)); Lynn D. Wardle, Fighting With Phantmm: A Reply to WarrinJ; With 
Wardle 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (responding to a rebuttal of his original article, The Potential Im-
pact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, by Carlos A. Ball & Janice 
Farrell Pea, Warring With Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, !998 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 253). In the case of Professor Wardle's article, one of the respondents was the editor-in-
chief of the law review at the time it published his original article. Lynn D. Wardle, FiJ;htinJ; With 
Phantomc A Reply to Warring With Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 n.4. I have co-written two 
articles to which rebuttals have been mentioned as a possibility before the articles were published. In 
one case, the rebuttal never appeared, and in the other, it is forthcoming. In fairness, proponents of 
marriage laws that define marriage as the union of a man and a woman have been solicited in a few 
symposia. See Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent Ration-
ality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to Prrifessor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 147 (1997); David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for 
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In addition, the University of North Carolina published an online le-
gal journal, the National Journal of Sexual Orientation Law for a number 
of years, and Tulane Law School publishes a journal called Law and 
Sexuality: A Review of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Legal 
Issues. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court case on whether the Boy Scouts can be 
compelled to admit openly homosexual leaders, the Society of American 
Law Teachers filed an amici brief supporting the homosexual plaintiff.305 
Finally, an ("AALS") survey in 1990 indicated that 80% of respond-
ing schools had adopted policies prohibiting "sexual orientation" dis-
crimination.306 A decade later, the LSAC reported that all but one of the 
169 schools responding to its survey had such a policy. 307 The LSAC 
also reported that 67 ( 40%) of these schools provided some type of part-
nership benefits for homosexual employees.308 
VIII. LAW FIRMS 
In 1996, the National Association for Law Placement ("NALP") be-
gan to request participating law firms to provide information on the 
number of "openly gay" employees at the firm in their informational 
forms filed with law schools at the beginning of the recruiting season.309 
Using the example of New York, the NALP directory for 1997-1998 in-
dicates that of the city's twenty-five largest law firms, eighteen reported 
at least one "openly gay" employee; six reported more than ten employ-
ees who identified themselves as "openly gay."310 Another commentator 
has noted: "The Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Yell ow Pages contains 
forty-two pages of attorney listings that includes sixty different law 
firms."311 
Interestingly, one very large New York firm-Milbank, Tweed, Had-
ley & McCloy-was a named contributor to the Harvard Law School 
Lambda Conference on same-sex "marriage" held in February 1999.312 
a Vermont Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REV. 61 (2000). 
305. Brief of Society of American Law Teachers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
306. Hartwell, supra note 267, at 229. 
307. OUT AND IN, supra note 235. 
308. /d. 
309. Edward A. Adams, Firms Report Totals of Gay Attorneys, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 1997, at AI. 
310. Openly Gay & Lesbian Lawyers at New York's 25 Largest Law Firm~. N.Y. L.J., Feb. 22, 
1999. 
311. Rubinstein, supra note 71, at 385. 
312. Freedom to Marry Conference Schedule. The schedule lists Milbank as a "Platinum Tri-
angle Donor" for contributing $1000 or more. 
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Other major contributors to the conference included four other national 
law firms. 313 
Perhaps more telling is the prevalence of domestic partnership bene-
fits being offered by law firms. A 1994 article in an ABA publication 
noted that law firms "lag behind other industries" in terms of offering 
domestic partnership benefits to employees.314 It cited Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy as typical of the firms that were then offering such 
benefits. Milbank restricted the benefits to same-sex couples (because 
others can marry) and required an affidavit to be filed to establish a do-
mestic partnership.315 It seems that the reticence to offer the benefits has 
changed since that article, though, and now the Human Rights Campaign 
lists at least 103 law firms throughout the United States which it says are 
offering domestic partnership policies for their employees.316 
Eleven bar associations have conducted surveys regarding "sexual 
orientation" discrimination in the legal profession.317 The associations 
conducting the surveys were bar associations in California (the State 
Bar), San Francisco (which conducted two studies), Los Angeles, New 
York (which conducted three), Seattle, Minneapolis/St.Paul, and Bos-
ton.318 Even sympathetic commentators note serious methodological 
problems with the studies such that "it would be a mistake to attempt to 
draw definitive conclusions about the quantity of sexual orientation bias 
in the legal profession from these reports."319 Indeed, the benefit of such 
reports seems to be in providing "support for the argument that such bias 
exists and in giving voice to the nature of that bias."320 The studies gen-
erally recommend such things as adoption of non-discrimination policies 
by firms, outreach to "openly gay" lawyers and law students in recruit-
ing, provision of domestic partner benefits for same-sex partners of at-
torneys, and mentoring programs for "openly gay" attorneys. 321 In re-
viewing these studies, Professor William B. Rubinstein encouraged 
313. /d. The contributors were: Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison of New York 
($1000 or more); McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen of San Francisco; Morrison & Forester of 
San Francisco; and Sullivan & Cromwell of New York ("Gold Triangle Donors" $500 to $1 000). 
314. Henry Goldblatt, Out of Step with the Times, 21 HUM. RTS., 24 Fall 1994. 
315. /d. at 25 (if the partnership terminates, a six-month waiting period is required before an-
other can begin). 
316. See Human Rights Campaign, Employers with Domestic Partnership Policies (March 8, 
1999) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/dp/dplist.html>. 
317. See Rubinstein, supra note 71, at 379. 
318. /d. at 385-386. The voluminous report of the Los Angeles County Bar Association is re-
printed at The Los Angeles County Bar Association Report on Sexual Orientation Bias, 4 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 297 ( 1995). 
319. /d. at 392. 
320. /d. 
321. /d. at 396-397. 
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similar studies by judiciaries because "a final report published by the ju-
diciary itself would place the state's imprimatur on efforts to uncover 
sexual orientation bias."322 
A commentator has also noted that large law firms lavish pro bono 
help on causes such as same-sex "marriage" and forcing the Scouts to 
accept openly homosexualleaders.323 For example, 
when the ABA sent out a call for additional firms to represent homo-
sexual scoutmaster James Dale against the Boy Scouts, Morrison & 
Foerster's pro bono coordinator Kathi Pugh had a Mo Foe attorney 
lined up 'within an hour,' she says. Other firms, such as Kramer[,] 
Levin[,] Naftalis[,] and Frankel, signed up as well. 324 
Other large, prominent firms have done similar work. Sullivan & Crom-
well in New York has done pro bono work for Lambda and on "gay 
rights" issues for some years.325 New York's Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom was given special recognition by the Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance Against Defamation in 1996 for its pro bono work on behalf of 
homosexual causes.326 Another New York firm, Covington & Burling, 
has given pro bono representation in a number of "gays in the military" 
cases, where the military's policy has been challenged.327 The Human 
Rights Campaign reports that it receives extensive support from numer-
ous law firms, many on a pro bono basis.328 Recently, the National Law 
Journal noted that "among the pro bono projects there were a significant 
number of cases involving controversial gay and lesbian rights."329 The 
article cites an attorney at the Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund who notes that "the private bar's pro bono contributions to lesbian 
and gay legal issues have gone up exponentially during the past 10 
years."33° For one of its pro bono awards, the Journal recognized the at-
torneys for the plaintiffs in the Vermont case that resulted in the creation 
of a new status of "civil unions," which provided all of the benefits of 
marriage to same-sex couples.331 
322. !d. at 386. 
323. Heather MacDonald, What Good is Pro Bono?, 10 CITY J. 2, Spring 2000, at 14. 
324. /d. 
325. See Directory of Law Firm Pro Bono Activities, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 22, 1994, at B 11-12. 
326. See Skadden, HBO Official Honored by Gay Unit, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 22, 1996, at 4. 
327. See Marcia Coyle, Covington Wins for a Seaman, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 6, 1997, at A4. 
328. See Fighting for Equal Rights <mAll Fronts, NAT'L. L.J., May I, 2000, at B I. 
329. Pro Bono in 2000, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000-Jan. I, 2001, at AIO. 
330. /d. 
331. David E. Rovella, Protecting the Civil Union Law, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000-Jan. I, 
2001, at Al6. 
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IX. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
One of the most insightful-and disturbing-windows on the view 
of the legal profession (at least some very influential members of it) on 
marriage, comes through in an examination of the recently approved 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ("Principles") put together 
by the American Law Institute ("ALI").332 The historic contributions of 
the ALI towards legal changes have not necessarily been salutary.333 But 
aspects of the recent Principles are particularly troubling. 
One disturbing part of the Principles is chapter 6, which recom-
mends the creation of certain rights to be made available to unmarried 
couples on the dissolution of their relationship. This chapter defines 
"domestic partners" as "two persons of the same or opposite sex, not 
married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a pri-
mary residence and a life together as a couple."334 Later, the Principles 
use the following description: "In general, domestic partners are two per-
sons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a 
significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as 
a couple."335 Perhaps most startling in this proposal is the fact that a cou-
ple can establish a domestic partnership with a partner even if they are 
married to someone else! 336 The Principles would provide to domestic 
partners many of the rights associated with marriage, including concepts 
analogous to marital property, property division, and alimony. 337 
Further, the Principles create new statuses of "de facto" parents and 
"parents by estoppel" who are adults close to the child that will be given 
status equal to the biological parent of the child.338 Obviously, unmarried 
partners of a child's biological parent, such as same-sex partners, are the 
most likely beneficiaries of such a policy. Indeed, the Principles specifi-
cally provide that the fact that the couple is a same-sex couple should not 
332. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Tentative Draft No.4§ 6.01 (Apr. 10, 2000). 
333. Indeed, the ALI itself notes (presumably with some pride) that Playboy magazine ranked 
the ALI 34th in its list of "men and women who changed the face of sex, for good or bad, during the 
past hundred years." Playboy Pays Tribute to ALI, THE ALI REPORTER (Fall 1999). The entry, ac-
cording to the ALI Reporter read: 'The American Law Institute: The unsung heroes of the sexual 
revolution. In 1960 this group of legal scholars drafted a model penal code that decriminalized sex-
ual activity between consenting adults (from sodomy to fornication)." /d. 
334. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Tentative Draft No.4§ 6.01(1). 
335. /d. at §6.03(1). 
336. See id. at § 6.0 I (5). 
337. See id. at §§ 6.04-6.06. 
338. See id. at§ 2.03. 
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be taken into consideration in making decisions related to parental 
rights. 339 
X. CONCLUSION 
It is, of course, difficult to gauge the effect of all of these develop-
ments. It seems fair to assume that the aggressive embrace of policies fa-
voring legal protections of homosexual persons as part of a specific class 
will make those who are critical of such an approach, including those fa-
voring traditional marriage, hesitant to openly voice their objections. An-
ecdotal evidence indicates that those who speak openly in opposition to 
same-sex marriage face opprobrium from the public and sometimes dis-
favor within the legal comrnunity.340 In the legal education establishment 
where the aims of "gay rights" proponents seem to be most firmly en-
trenched, the potential effect is obvious-lawyers will be trained in the 
view that there is no legal or moral justification for traditional marriage 
laws and policies. This could easily lead to the establishment of some-
thing like a "lawyer class" in regards to this issue even if the general 
public holds to the opposite perspective.341 
James Madison's discussion of factions in Federalist 10 may be rele-
vant here.342 Madison describes a faction as "a number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are 
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
339. See id. at 211 & 216. 
340. See Wardle, supra note 305, at 630 (describing "outbursts of anger and explosions of 
hostility from persons who disagree with my positions I have taken on this and similar issues (for 
example, same-sex marriage)"); Gilbert Meilaender, Brinf?ing One's Life to a Point, FIRST THINGS, 
November 1994, at 31 (describing attacks after the author signed a statement critical of the ideology 
of "gay rights"); Leslie Reed, Emotion Fills Debate Over Gay Marriage, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 
Sept. 29, 2000, at 19 (describing attacks on a law professor defending marriage); Kristy K. Bruns. 
DOMA Debate Flames, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 5, 2000, at 12 (describing attacks on a law 
professor defending marriage); Marianne Moody Jennings, Same-Sex Marriage Critic Punished by 
Intolerance, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 28, 1996, at H3 (describing vandalism and threats after article 
criticizing same-sex marriage published in newspaper); Lynn D. Wardle, When Dissent is Stifled: 
The Same-Sex Marriage and Right-to-Treatment Debates, NARTH BULL., August 2000, at 26 (de-
scribing verbal attacks and ostracism in legal academic settings because of position against same-sex 
marriage and homosexual adoption). 
341. A poll commissioned for the World Congress on the Family and performed by Wirthlin 
Worldwide indicated that 83% of Americans agreed with the statement: "The definition of marriage 
is one man and one woman." World Conf?ress Global Survey Findings (Nov. 3, 1999); see also The 
Howard Center, World Conf?ress of Families II (visited Jan. 31, 200 I) <http://www.worldcongress 
.org!WCF2/wcf2_survey.htm>. 
342. I am indebted to Dean Robert Destro for his intriguing suggestion that Federalist 10 may 
be applicable here. This subject is worthy of a more exhaustive discussion than I am, of necessity, 
able to provide in this article. 
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interests of the community."343 While Madison despaired of ridding gov-
ernment entirely of factions, he felt that the normal structure of republi-
can government was the best way to ameliorate the damage that could be 
done by factions. 344 
In the situation described in this article, though, there are two poten-
tial challenges to the normal process of submerging factional interests. 
First is the challenge when a faction takes on a governmental or quasi-
governmental role, such as where professional legal associations are al-
lowed to promulgate rules, approve government appointments, etc. The 
second occurs where normal checks inherent in government structure are 
undermined because one branch of government, unduly influenced by a 
faction, exercises limitless discretion in decision making (as I would ar-
gue that courts have done in the same-sex marriage litigation).345 Argua-
bly, both problems are evidenced in the circumstances this article de-
scribes, leading to a corruption of the political process that could threaten 
marriage and democracy. 
This is, of course, not a foregone conclusion, but the possibility 
should be taken seriously, and this developing orthodoxy should be chal-
lenged in the name of tolerance and diversity. 
343. THE FEDERALIST No. I 0, 54 (James Madison) (Prometheus Books, 2000). 
344. See id. at 59. 
345. This is indicated by the fact that when courts have decided this issue, they have made a 
significantly different decision than the people have made when given the same choice. See William 
C. Duncan, Impasse in the Marriage Debate,_ TRINITY L. REV._ (2000). 
